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ABSTRACT

Entrepreneurs need resources. Previous research has established that entrepreneurs send signals
of “quality” to potential resource providers in order to obtain resources. However, a behavioral
research approach would contend that resource acquisition depends on much more than venture
quality signals. In this dissertation, I extend beyond the signaling paradigm and investigate the
resource acquisition process using a framework contingent on entrepreneur signals, resource
provider dispositional differences, and their interactive effects. Specifically, I leverage regulatory
focus theory and regulatory fit theory to augment and move beyond the signaling theory
approach. Methodologically, I undertake two studies. The first study uses archival field data
consisting of a sample of 895 new venture pitches. In each of these pitches, I analyze the
displays of promotion and prevention focus sent by entrepreneurs across video and textual
narratives. To complete this analysis I develop novel measures of promotion and prevention
focus suitable for computer-aided textual analysis (CATA). In the second study, I use a sample
of 120 investors and a quasi-experimental approach to assess the moderating role of investorlevel promotion and prevention focus on the relationship between entrepreneur displays of
promotion and prevention focus and resource acquisition. The findings and their implications are
discussed in relation to extant new venture resource acquisition literature and regulatory focus
theory.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research Highights
Theoretical highlights:
This research...
o Contributes to the strategic judgment literature by drawing upon a wellestablished stream of social-psychology research to consider the role of selfregulation in the resource allocation process.
o Integrates the regulatory focus literature with the new venture resource
acquisition literature in order to develop a conceptual framework to explain
how resource acquisition for new firms is influenced by factors at multiple
levels (i.e. the firm/entrepreneur level and individual investor level)

Methodological highlights:
o A novel instrument for measuring regulatory focus using Computer Aided
Textual Analysis (CATA) methodology is developed.
o The external validity of the regulatory focus construct is advanced through a
novel mixed-methodology approach at the strategic-organization level
(experimental techniques combined with a field-based content analysis).

Practical highlights:
o Contrary to popular anecdotal advice given to entrepreneurs, this research
argues that displays of prevention focus can increase the likelihood of
acquiring resources, particularly when a prevention-fit occurs between the
prevention displays and the resource provider’s dominant regulatory focus.
o Best practices and contingency considerations for developing fundable pitches
are discussed.
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1.2 Introduction
Acquiring resources in the early stages of venture creation is critical for new
venture survival (Bhide, 2003). Because new ventures tend to lack valuable strategic
resources (Aghion & Tirole, 2004), firm founders are inclined to pursue proactive
strategies in order to acquire critical resources from external parties (Zott & Huy, 2007).
However, given the hazards and liabilities associated with nascent ventures
(Stinchcombe, 1965), external parties are often reluctant to commit resources in the early
stages of venture development (Hellmann & Puri, 2002).
Consequently, much previous research has focused on how entrepreneurs signal
the quality of their ventures to external resource providers (e.g., investors, bankers,
suppliers, providers of labor). To signal quality entrepreneurs often develop scripted or
unscripted pitches to increase their chances of acquiring resources from external resource
holders (Chen, Yao, & Kotha, 2009). Such scripts or narratives are commonly found in
various business documents including business plans, company websites, shareholder
letters, and more recently crowdfunding profiles (e.g., Allison, McKenny, & Short, 2013;
Ciuchta, Letwin, Stevenson, & McMahon, 2016).
There is a plethora of excellent research focused on understanding the criteria that
resource providers use to analyze such narratives and make resource allocation decisions.
For instance, MacMillan, Siegel and Narasimha (1986) identified a number of cognitive
criteria that venture capitalists use to evaluate new venture proposals. These categories
include evaluations of the entrepreneur’s ability, evaluations of the characteristics of the
product or service, evaluations of the characteristics of the market, and the financial
considerations of the investment. Likewise, Maxwell, Jeffrey, & Lévesque (2011)
2

identified eight key criteria to explain how angel investors quantify business quality
deficiencies in a non-compensatory way during the resource allocation decision process.
A variety of other work has investigated and developed lists of the key cognitive investor
criteria that theoretically drive resource allocation decisions (e.g., Feeney, Haines, &
Riding, 1999; Haines Jr., Madill, & Riding, 2003; Mason & Stark, 2004; Sudek, 2006). In
terms of theoretical structure, a wide assortment of such work has drawn primarily upon
theories of signaling (e.g., Backes-gellner & Werner, 2007; Elitzur & Gavious, 2003;
Moss, Neubaum, & Meyskens, 2015). In addition, this stream of “resource provider
criteria” has been particularly focused on understanding the decision criteria of
sophisticated and professional private market investors, such as venture capitalists or
angel investors.
While the insights garnered from the body of extant research in this area have
been many, there has been growing empirical interest in understanding how nonprofessional private market resource providers make resource allocation decisions.
Moreover, theoretical interest in understanding how less than fully cognitive factors drive
judgments and resource allocation decisions has recently intensified (Grégoire,
Cornelissen, Dimov, & van Burg, 2015; Shepherd, Williams, & Patzelt, 2015). Although
extant research in the strategic management literature suggests that quality signals can
positively impact resource acquisition through standard channels of new venture
communications (e.g., Zhang & Wiersema, 2009), little work has specifically attempted
to unpack the conative ‘micro-social’ processes that impact resource acquisition
decisions.i For instance, what factors outside of “espoused” core investment criteria
might shift resource provider decisions in significant ways? Beyond this, how might the
3

implicit matching between entrepreneur signaling and external resource provider conative
mindsets impact the allocation of resources?
In this dissertation, I leverage regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997), a socialpsychology theory of goal pursuit to investigate the role of conative (i.e., less than fully
cognitive; Johnson, Rosen, & Chang, 2010) resource provider factors in new venture
resource allocation decisions. As well, I show how entrepreneur displays of regulatory
focus - self regulatory strategies that individuals use to govern their goal striving
behaviors - provide important cues about the ways in which entrepreneurs intend to
manage their firms and ultimately impact their likelihood of successfully acquiring
resources. Regulatory focus theory, with its clarity around the forces of motivations,
goal-strategies, and conative behaviors provides a well-established social-psychological
framework suitable for integration into the domain of new venture resource acquisition.
Brockner, Higgins, and Low (2004) theorized about the underpinnings of
regulatory focus in the new venture resource acquisition context. Despite the growth of
regulatory focus theory as an explanatory framework in the context of organizations over
the past decade (for extensive reviews and meta-analytic analyses see Gorman et al.,
2012; Johnson, Smith, Wallace, Hill, & Baron, 2015; Lanaj, Chang, & Johnson, 2012),
their proposed relationships were not empirically tested. Comprehensively, my
investigation of regulatory focus signals and investor-level regulatory orientations
provide evidence that resource provider social psychological influences also play a
significant role in the resource acquisition process.

4

1.3 Format and Layout

This dissertation is structured as follows. First, I briefly outline the relevant
literature in chapter two. Next, in chapter three, I outline my integrative theoretical
arguments and develop formal hypotheses at the intersection of resource acquisition,
regulatory focus, and regulatory fit. In chapter four, I introduce and present the findings
from two empirical studies to test my hypotheses. Finally, in chapter five, I discuss the
theoretical and practical implications of my research and provide guidance for future
work.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Resource Acquisition in Entrepreneurship
Resource acquisition is critical for new ventures, as new ventures need resources
in order to launch, grow, and gain legitimacy (Bhide, 2003; Kotha & George, 2012;
Stinchcombe, 1965). Moreover, the contention that competitive advantage is contingent
upon resource acquisition has become a cornerstone principle of strategic management
(Barney, 1991; Hitt, Ireland, Camp, & Sexton, 2001; Penrose, 1959). Since organizations
are continually challenged to improve performance, firms need to pursue proactive
strategies in order to acquire these critical resources (George, 2005). Recent empirical
work has highlighted the importance of resource acquisition for firm legitimacy (Zott &
Huy, 2007), firm survival (Martens, Jennings, & Jennings, 2007), and operational
performance (Rungtusanatham, Salvador, Forza, & Choi, 2003).
Acquiring resources in the nascent stage is important because it sets the stage for
subsequent, reoccurring, or later stage resource acquisition which functions to enhance
long-term performance (Patel & Jayaram, 2014; Zott & Huy, 2007). In this way, success
achieved in acquiring early-stage resources improves the firm’s ability to pursue and
obtain additional resources in the future. Thus, success in early stage resource acquisition
is not only vital for the launch stage but is also important over the long term, as it
enhances the firm’s own resource acquisition capability.

6

2.1.1 The Challenge of Acquiring Resources for New Ventures
Firms understand that resource acquisitions should be a paramount goal and one
that is critical to their own existence (George, 2005). However, acquiring resources is not
a straight-forward nor well-defined process for early stage firms. Indeed, there are
immense challenges associated with resource acquisition that contribute to the high
failure rate of firms (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Parhankangas & Ehrlich, 2014). In fact,
failure rates in the first five years of business are reported to be 50% and 78% for small
businesses and new technology ventures respectively (Song, Podoynitsyna, van der Bij,
& Halman, 2008; U.S Small Business Administration, 2012). In light of this, scholars
have made it a priority to understand the sources of firm success with regard to resource
acquisition (e.g., Maxwell & Lévesque, 2011; Moss et al., 2015; Zimmerman & Zeitz,
2002).
The data on financial resource acquisition failure rates is even more dismal than
the data on overall firm failure rates. Nearly 97% of ventures seeking capital fail to attract
funding (Riding, Madill, & Haines Jr, 2007). In fact, even among the most capable
growth firms, only a small percentage are successful at securing financial resources from
traditional equity investors. Analysis from the Kauffman Foundation using data from the
Inc. 500 fastest growing companies list demonstrates that only 14.2% of firms attracted
traditional sources of equity funding during their launch and growth stages (Harrison,
2015; Displayed as Table 1). Nascent firms fail to attract capital at such high rates
because the majority of these firms lack proven competencies or valuable resources that
tend to attract external resource providers (Zott & Huy, 2007).

7

Given the risks associated with early stage investing and the entrepreneurship
process in general (Stinchcombe, 1965), resource holders are often reluctant to commit
their capital or resources to new ventures (Bhide, 2003; Hellmann & Puri, 2002).
Scholars argue that this reluctance centers on the high levels of information asymmetry
that is replete in new venture investment opportunities (Van Osnabrugge, 2000). That is
to say, the entrepreneur knows much more about the internal attributes of his or her own
venture than the investor (Amit, Brander, & Zott, 1998; Pollack & Bosse, 2014;
Steverson, Rutherford, & Buller, 2013).
Related scholarship also endorses that the lack of available and verifiable
information for investors is the key difference between the new venture investment
setting and the public market setting (Rosenbusch, Brinckmann, & Müller, 2013). Thus,
to effectively acquire resources, firms must find ways to communicate with investors by
using language (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; e.g., Mollick, 2014; Nagy, Pollack,
Rutherford, & Lohrke, 2012), symbols (e.g., Rutherford, Buller, & Stebbins, 2009; Zott
& Huy, 2007), strategic actions (e.g., Baum & Silverman, 2004; Wry, Lounsbury, &
Jennings, 2014; Wry & Lounsbury, 2013), or other strategies that convey the
characteristics of their ventures (e.g., Le & Nguyen, 2009; Starr & MacMillan, 1990).
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Table 1: Sources of Capital for New Ventures
Kauffman Study of Small
Businesses
Category
Bank & other loans
Personal savings
Friends, family & acquaintances
Credit cards
Angel investors
Venture capital
Government related
Other / no financing

Total
Count
38,059
32,658
6,910
6,756
6,350
4,804
2,129
11,350

Percentage
of Deals
34.91%
29.96%
6.34%
6.20%
5.82%
4.41%
1.95%
10.41%

n=109,016 transactions with more
than 5,000 firms

Kauffman Study of
Inc. 500 firms
Total
Count
248
322
193
163
37
31
18
65

Percentage
of Firms
49.60%
64.40%
38.60%
32.60%
7.40%
6.20%
3.60%
13.00%

n=500 firms

note: Adapted from Harrison (2015). Research conducted by the Kauffman Foundation and reported by the Washington
Post.
source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-small-business/wp/2015/03/16/no-entrepreneurs-most-of-you-dontneed-angel-investors-or-venture-capitalists/
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2.1.2 Overview of the Sources of Acquirable Financial Resources
New ventures are wealth-constrained and typically unable to develop resources
internally (Aghion & Tirole, 2004). For this reason, new ventures often require capital
from external resource providers (Kotha & George, 2012). These resources may be in the
form of physical goods, knowledge (e.g., Sampson, 2007), social capital (e.g., Park &
Steensma, 2012), network ties (e.g., Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012), or financial capital (e.g.,
Ahlers, Cumming, Guenther, & Schweizer, 2015; de Bettignies & Brander, 2007; Le &
Nguyen, 2009; Zacharakis, McMullen, & Shepherd, 2007).
In this dissertation, acquired resources are operationalized in an external
investment context. Thus, to provide context, I review the literature on the five most
common classifications of external investments: (1) Initial public offerings, (2)
Professional private investors: venture capitalists and angel investors, (3) Nonprofessional investors: friends, family, and close business associates (4) Non-professional
investors: equity crowdfunding, (5) Non-professional investors: Non-equity
crowdfunding.

2.1.2.1 Initial public offerings (IPO)
Initial Public Offerings (IPO) occur when private ventures become listed on
public stock exchanges for the first time. These firms “list” or “go public” via IPO in
order to raise new capital for their firms (Benninga, Helmantel, & Sarig, 2005).
Completing an IPO requires that firms sell off existing or newly generated shares in
exchange for cash purchases by institutional or private public market investors (Cornelli,
10

Goldreich, & Ljungqvist, 2006). The money raised by these firms is often used to expand
operations or to continue to grow existing commercial operations.
The process of taking a company public via an IPO is complex and costly
(Benninga et al., 2005; Deeds, Decarolis, & Coombs, 1997). Firms typically do not
complete an IPO until they have made substantial traction in a particular market, have
novel patented technologies (e.g., chemical formulations for a new pharmaceutical
product), or have established resources that can be exploited in the near future (e.g., a
discovered gold deposit). IPOs are typically not feasible for new ventures since
successful IPOs generally require proven track records, technologies, or resources.
One of the key differences between the IPO context and other private financing
modes (e.g., venture capital, crowdfunding) relates to the availability of public
information (Rosenbusch et al., 2013). Public stock exchanges require formalized and
fully audited information about firms who wish to list on these exchanges for several
years prior to listing. As a result, information asymmetry decreases between the
entrepreneur and the investor during the IPO and public stages of organizational
development (Rosenbusch et al., 2013). As information asymmetry decreases, the stories
or narratives crafted directly by the entrepreneur are less critical determinants of investor
selection (Zott & Huy, 2007). On the contrary, crafted narratives are theorized to have
“significant impact on enabling capital acquisition and wealth creation in the emergent or
earliest stages of new venture formation” (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001: 550), yet this area
tends to be under-researched (Zott & Huy, 2007).

11

2.1.2.2 Professional private investors: Venture capitalists and angel investors
Professional private equity markets began to emerge shortly after World War II
with the development of the first formal venture capital firms (Bygrave & Timmons,
1992). Today, the professional private equity funding markets consists of angel investors
and corporate and independent venture capitalists, who participate to varying degrees in
financing new ventures (Freear, Sohl, & Wetzel, 1994; Park & Steensma, 2012). The
total market for these professional private investments was estimated to account for more
than $57 billion via more than 70,000 deals in 2012 (PWC, 2013; Sohl, 2013).
These investors are generally either formalized institutions or accredited private
individuals. Accredited investors are defined as individuals with “net worth, or joint net
worth with that person’s spouse, at the time of his purchase exceeds $1,000,000.”
Alternatively an individual can be defined as an accredited investor if that individual has
income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years, or if jointly with the
individual’s spouse family income exceeds $300,000 in each of the two preceding years,
[with] a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year
(Bradford, 2012). As a result of these high income or net worth restrictions, “private”
markets are often artificially constrained in terms of total market participation and
liquidity.
Although much academic work outlines how professional private investors use
rational decision-making models to select investments (MacMillan et al., 1986; Maxwell
et al., 2011; Sudek, 2006), contrasting evidence demonstrates that many professional
private investment decisions rely on intuition and ‘gut-feel’ (Mason & Harrison, 2002;
Shepherd, Zacharakis, & Baron, 2003). Recent work has broadened this investigation to
12

consider how entrepreneurs might be able to strategically vary their pitch in an effort to
increase their chances of successfully acquiring resources from private investors. For
instance, Maxwell & Lévesque (2011) demonstrated how entrepreneurs can increase their
perceived trustworthiness with investors by utilizing impression management techniques.
In a similar vein, scholars have examined the influence of signals of entrepreneurial
passion on the acquisition of resources in professional private investment settings
(Mitteness, Cardon, & Sudek, 2010; Mitteness, Sudek, & Cardon, 2012).
In summary, unlike with IPOs and public markets there is a higher degree of
uncertainty in angel and venture investments, and thus entrepreneurial storytelling and
pitching becomes relatively more important for entrepreneurs seeking to acquire
resources from these professional private investors (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). In these
investment markets, savvy entrepreneurs frequently utilize impression management
techniques to send quality signals to private investors (Baron & Markman, 2000; Clark,
2008). This process is an attempt by the entrepreneur to influence the perceptions of
external parties about the quality of their venture (Nagy et al., 2012; Parhankangas &
Ehrlich, 2014; Rutherford et al., 2009).

2.1.2.3 Non-professional investors: friends, family, and close business associates
In the United States, non-professional investors are typically restricted from
investing in new ventures based upon the legislation put forth in the long-standing
Securities Act of 1933. These private placement restrictions are currently enforced by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC; Bradford, 2012). Specifically, the Securities
Act of 1933 makes the solicitation of unaccredited investors by non-public enterprises a
13

prohibited practice. Initially, this legislation was designed to protect non-sophisticated
individual investors from fraudulent entrepreneurs that were plaguing the capital market
system during the 1920’s and 1930’s (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2013; Simon,
1989). However, the legislation has continued to be enforced, thereby effectively
eliminating or significantly restricting participation in early-stage investment for the great
majority of non-professional unaccredited investors (Simon, 1989).
A notable exception to this legislation exists for individuals deemed to be friends,
family, or close business associates of the entrepreneur seeking capital. This exemption
allows private firms to raise capital from friends and family without going public by
utilizing the Regulation D Private Placement Exemptions (Warren III, 1984). Despite this
exemption, there is some survey evidence that borrowers avoid family finance when
possible (Robb & Robinson, 2014). Lee & Persson (2012) developed a model which
explains that, although informal capital from friends and family is offered cheap and in
abundance, entrepreneurs seem to prefer formal financial capital utilizing arm’s length
exchanges. They theorize that investments from closely related parties amplify the threat
of losing relationships and, due to the entrepreneur’s aversion to failure, the demand for
friends and family funds is diminished.

2.1.2.4 Non-professional investors: equity crowdfunding
Recently, new legislation has been promoted at the federal level to open up new
venture investing to individuals who fall outside of the specific classification of friends,
family, business associates, or accredited investors (Bradford, 2012). Specifically, on
April 5th, 2012, President Obama signed new legislation intended to repeal certain
14

wording from the Securities Act of 1933, effectively making equity crowdfunding a legal
and viable alternative for private ventures (Parrino & Romeo, 2012). This legislation,
known as the Jumpstart Our Business Startups ("JOBS") Act is currently being reviewed
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as they work to define the specific
governing rules for equity crowdfunding. The JOBS Act instructs the SEC to provide an
exception to the general solicitation prohibition for offerings made in accordance with
Rule 506. The JOBS Act instructs the SEC to enable equity crowdfunding as a viable and
legal option for private enterprises. Prior to the JOBS Act, the Securities Act of 1933
prohibited general solicitation, which effectively prohibited private firms from
advertising or pursuing funding sources from the Internet, print, or radio (Parrino &
Romeo, 2012).
Although President Obama signed the JOBS Act in 2012, the final enactment of
these rules has been delayed for quite some time by SEC procedures. After close to
eighteen months since signing the JOBS Act, general solicitation became an official and
accepted practice with the passing of Title II on September 23, 2013. Title II allows
investors to advertise their offerings on the Internet, print, or radio, but does specifically
allow them to receive funds via such portals from unaccredited investors. This is the next
required step to fully enable equity crowdfunding as a legal practice as mandated in
section 302(a) of the JOBS Act. In 2013, the SEC panel unanimously voted to define
rules allowing unaccredited investors to partake in equity crowdfunding, but these rules
have yet to be defined and are still in the public comment stage. The proposed rules have
a number of limitations for unaccredited investors. Specifically, individuals who earn less
than $100,000 per annum may invest up to a maximum of 5% or $2,000 of their annual
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income. Additionally, proposed rules limit firms to a maximum annual amount of $1
million annually (SEC, 2013).
The introduction of equity crowdfunding via recent statutory modifications (i.e.,
the JOBS Act) indicates a potential transformation for the venture funding landscape
(Bradford, 2012; Dushnitsky & Marom, 2013). The JOBS Act and related legislation in
the U.S is intended to allow private firms to raise capital from unaccredited investors for
the first time in the U.S. since 1933 (Parrino & Romeo, 2012). Equity crowdfunding
reform has widespread implications for new ventures, the finance industry, and the longterm prosperity of the economy, as it represents a potential new investment paradigm for
fund-seeking firms (Harrison, 2013). For the first time in the history of the United States,
anyone with a computer and some investable capital can function as a source of equity
capital for new and emerging private ventures (Bradford, 2012).
In terms of empirical work conducted to date, it is not surprising that, given the
recent occurrence of these legal modifications, scholarship on equity crowdfunding is
only in its infancy. Currently, only one published paper has specifically utilized an equity
crowdfunding sampling frame (Ahlers et al., 2015). In this paper, Ahlers et al. (2015)
demonstrated that social capital and intellectual capital have little or no impact on
funding success in an equity crowdfunding environment. However, human capital signals
by entrepreneurs and signals about uncertainty or enterprise risks can strongly impact the
probability of funding success. These initial discoveries contrast findings from extant
research in traditional private equity markets (e.g., Hsu, 2007; Shane & Stuart, 2002) and
signify a potential divergence in the factors that predict resource acquisition in
crowdfunding markets.
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2.1.2.5 Non-professional investors: Non-equity crowdfunding
As noted above, equity crowdfunding has yet to be thoroughly enacted around the
world. As a result it is only in its infancy in terms of investigation by entrepreneurship
scholars. However, a related and emerging body of literature on non-equity crowdfunding
has the potential to inform the entrepreneurship literature as well. In general, non-equity
crowdfunding can be defined as arms-length transactions with a large pool of generally
unsophisticated funders that each provide small amounts of capital without the promise of
stock in the firm (Belleflamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, 2013; Mollick, 2014).
According to industry data in 2012, there were more than one million crowdfunding
campaigns across eight-hundred crowdfunding platforms (Massolution, 2013). In total,
these campaigns amassed more than two and a half billion dollars in funding
(Massolution, 2013).
Non-equity crowdfunding is currently developing in a number of distinct forms.
These forms include donation-based crowdfunding, peer-to-peer debt crowdfunding, and
rewards-based crowdfunding. In donation-based crowdfunding, funders contribute to
projects or organizations in the form of non-repayable donations. Funders are motivated
by intrinsic motivations or social causes and generally receive no physical incentives or
financial returns (Dushnitsky & Marom, 2013). In peer-to-peer debt-based crowdfunding,
funders contribute to campaigns in the form of repayable loans which may be interestbearing or occasionally, if the lender is socially motivated, may be zero-rated but still
repayable in terms of the principle amount (Dushnitsky & Marom, 2013).
Initial studies at the intersection of donations-based and peer-to-peer
crowdfunding have demonstrated that crowdfunding campaigns that frame their narrative
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as an opportunity to help others increase funding speed relative to narratives that frame
campaigns as an opportunity for a new business emergence (Allison, Davis, Short, &
Webb, 2015). In a related study, with a sample of crowdfunding narratives from
impoverished nations, Allison et al. (2013) concluded that a “warm-glow” feeling
(Andreoni, 1990) was a predictive factor for crowdfunding projects. Specifically, in this
study, crowdfunding narratives which emphasized blaming language and present-concern
raised funding sooner in comparison with narratives which emphasized accomplishments
and tenacity. In apparent contrast to these findings, other early work in this area has
demonstrated that displays of empathy, warmth, conscientiousness and courage reduce
funding prospects (Moss et al., 2015). Moss et al. (2015) also found that narratives which
signal competitive aggressiveness, risk-taking, and autonomy have the potential to
increase funding success. These studies have predominantly relied on a textual analysis
methodology leaving an opportunity for researchers to utilize complementary approaches.
The third category of non-equity crowdfunding is known as rewards-based
crowdfunding. In rewards-based crowdfunding, funders provide investments in the form
of unsecured capital or pre-purchases (Belleflamme et al., 2013). These investments are
provided for products, services, or other rewards. These other rewards could include
anything from public acknowledgements (e.g., a thank you note displayed on the
Internet), interactions (e.g., a rare personal meeting with a company founder or celebrity),
or experiences (e.g., a guest appearance in movie). In the case of products or services, the
entrepreneurs often promise to provide these goods or services at a later date, contingent
upon a successful campaign and after some pre-specified amount of time during which
the entrepreneur plans to engage in development and initial commercialization.
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Initial studies in this area have focused on which campaign characteristics
successfully maximize funding prospects for firms. For instance, displays of social
capital as operationalized through social network contacts was shown to be positively
related to the amount of capital raised in rewards-based crowdfunding campaigns
(Mollick, 2014). Interestingly, however, the lack of any displays of social capital (i.e., not
having a Facebook account) improved funding prospects for entrepreneurs when
compared with displays of low social capital (i.e., having very few Facebook friends;
Mollick, 2014). Other early research in this area has demonstrated that the social capital
effect on funding success is fully mediated by the capital collected in the campaign’s first
few days (Colombo, Franzoni, & Rossi-Lamastra, 2015).
Burtch, Ghose, and Wattal (2012) undertook similar efforts to investigate the role
of social influence on funder behaviors. These authors found evidence that campaigns
convey high levels of social information as well as the presence of crowding-out effects.
These occur when incremental project contributions decrease the perceived importance of
the campaign to funders. In terms of funder geography, most initial funders tend to reside
in the same geographic region as the campaign’s creator (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb,
2011). Also, with regard to the delivery of products, services, or other rewards, Mollick’s
(2014) analysis of over forty-eight thousand rewards-based crowdfunding campaigns
revealed that, nearly three quarters of the time, products and rewards were not delivered
by the target date.
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2.2 The Resource Acquisition Process
In the previous section, I outlined the relevant literature related to financial
resource acquisition in entrepreneurship. Although I do not use it as a core theoretical
argument to motivate my hypothesis, in the next section I provide an overview of
signaling theory as it has played a vital role in past literature and seeks to explain how
signal senders convey information to outsiders. I then briefly outline how signaling
theory has been used in the entrepreneurship literature.

2.2.1 Brief Background on Signaling
Scholars have widely examined how individuals or organizations use displays or
signals to convey information about their own characteristics or the characteristics of
their resources to external parties (Connelly et al., 2011). The seminal article that set in
motion this signaling theory paradigm discusses the inefficacies of purchasing a used car
to capture the essence of the signaling problem. In his article, The market for "lemons":
Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism, Akerlof (1970) describes how, in the
absence of signals, a used car purchaser is unable to detect the quality of a good car or a
bad car (i.e., a “lemon”). Moreover, the presence of asymmetric information gives the
current owner of the car an informational advantage over the potential purchaser. Sellers
of “lemons” may seek to exploit this informational-advantage, whereas sellers of quality
cars are incentivized to reduce the presence of asymmetric information and attempt to
send signals about the true quality of their cars.
Signaling theory first emerged in the field of economics (Akerlof, 1970; Spence,
1973). The theory has become widely accepted. In fact, in 2001 the Nobel Prize in
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Economics was presented to Spence, Akerlof, and Stiglitz for their work in the discipline.
The theory was initially used to reconcile the recognition of the presence of imperfect
information in economic markets (Spence, 1973). The assumption of imperfect
information in markets continually crept into economic models in the 20th century
(Stiglitz, 2002). Prior to that time, economists had assumed away any observable or
unobservable informational imperfections as inconsequential variance in explaining any
deviations from markets with perfect information (Stiglitz, 2000).
Since its inception, signaling theory has rapidly developed into an influential
theory across many other areas of social science as well. For instance, it has been used in
biology (Zahavi, 1975), political science (Brehm & Gates, 1994), marketing (Swait́,
Erdem, Louviere, & Dubelaar, 1993), accounting (Morris, 1987), finance (Bhattacharya
& Ritter, 1983), strategic management (Goranova, Alessandri, Todd M, Brandes, &
Dharwadkar, 2007), and, more recently, entrepreneurship (Reuber & Fischer, 2009).
In terms of its current explanatory value, signaling theory is particularly effective
for exploring behaviors that one party uses to influence another party when information
asymmetry is present (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). According to the
theory, information senders use these signals to communicate positive details to outsiders
in order to reduce information asymmetry and transactional hazards with potential trading
partners (Janney & Folta, 2003). Fundamentally, there are two core problems that
signaling theory can be used to explain. First, how does a signaling party use signals to
persuade the receiver to take a desired action by conveying quality signals to the
receiver? Second, how does the receiver determine his or her actions upon analyzing the
signaling party’s signals?
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In order for signals to be effective, they must have two principal characteristics:
costliness and observability (Connelly et al., 2011). Costliness refers to the costs incurred
by the sender in order to develop and convey signals (Connelly et al., 2011), while
observability is the degree to which signals are noticeable by outsiders (Connelly et al.,
2011). Effective signals allow signal receivers to differentiate between high quality signal
senders and low quality signal senders. For example, good employees tend to accumulate
costly education in order to signal the quality of their labor to employers (Spence, 1973).
Professional credentials (e.g., Certified Public Accounting designation), college degrees
(e.g., Bachelor of Science), and industry certifications (e.g., Six Sigma) are all examples
of observable and costly signals (Moss et al., 2015).
It is important to note that signals are said to convey two types of information:
information about existing characteristics of signal senders and information about the
behavioral intentions of signal senders (Stiglitz, 1990). For investors, both extant
characteristics and behavioral intentions are critical cues in making their investment
decisions (Chung, Sensoy, Stern, & Weisbach, 2012; Maxwell et al., 2011; Maxwell &
Lévesque, 2011). Therefore, strategic managers who are seeking investment have an
incentive to attempt to convey positive information to investors in their formal
communications with those investors. For example, Zhang and Wiersema (2009) showed
how corporate Chief Executive Officers were able to effectively signal unobservable firm
qualities to investors via observable financial statements.
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2.2.2 Signals Sent by Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs have to sell or pitch their venture ideas to external resource
providers including potential investors (Chen et al., 2009). To do this, entrepreneurs often
develop pitch narratives to increase their chances of attracting funding by signaling to
outsiders where they intend to focus their attention in terms of strategic mission, value
proposition, and execution plan (Pollack, Rutherford, & Nagy, 2012). Such narratives are
commonly found in various documents including business plans, company websites,
shareholder letters, and, more recently, crowdfunding profiles (e.g., Allison et al., 2013;
Moss et al., 2015).
Entrepreneurs develop and convey these narratives to outside stakeholders in
order to attempt to acquire much needed resources. In this way, an entrepreneur can use
these narratives to send signals that convey characteristics of the firm and indicators of
the firm’s future behaviors. In terms of how certain language in narrative can lead to
resource acquisition, there is a large body of work in finance (e.g., Smith & Taffler,
2000) and accounting (e.g., Morris, 1987). More recently, entrepreneurship scholars have
begun to adopt this theoretical frame.
Specifically, in the entrepreneurship literature, signaling theory has been used to
investigate how entrepreneurs signal reputation in international markets using online
technology (Reuber & Fischer, 2009), how entrepreneurs signal legitimacy in transition
economies (Ivanova & Castellano, 2012), and strategic entrepreneurial entry into new
markets (Levie & Autio, 2011). In terms of early stage finance, signaling theorists have
investigated the impact of readily observable human capital characteristics (e.g., an
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entrepreneur’s academic background, management expertise, and technological
expertise) on resource acquisition and venture survival (Gimmon & Levie, 2010). More
recently, signaling theory has been employed in micro-lending and rewards-based
crowdfunding settings. Specifically, early work in this area has been focused on
understanding how signals drive crowdfunding investments. Initial studies have focused
on how firm or project level signals attract investment for new ventures (Allison et al.,
2013; Mollick, 2014; Moss et al., 2014).

2.3 Regulatory Focus & Regulatory Fit Theory
2.3.1 Regulatory Focus Theory
Regulatory Focus Theory has been commonly used to explain decision processes,
judgment, and strategies of goal pursuit. In recent years, scholarly work that draws upon
regulatory focus theory has continued to grow in numerous fields including management,
marketing, psychology, and finance (Mourali, Böckenholt, & Laroche, 2014; Sassenberg
& Woltin, 2009). Higgins’ (1997) original regulatory focus theoritical work has been
cited more than three thousand times. As well, over fourteen different scales have been
created to measure the construct (Gorman et al., 2012).
Regulatory focus theory identifies two stylized strategies of self-regulation that
individuals use to achieve goals. The first strategy is known as promotion focus, while
the later is known as a prevention focus (Higgins, 1997, 2002). Individuals are said to be
internally driven or regulated by these two distinct systems, such that high promotion
focused individuals are oriented to work toward goals that will allow them to achieve
idealized states (e.g., win an upcoming boxing match by becoming the strongest
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participant). On the other hand, high prevention focused individuals are oriented to work
toward goals that allow them to avoid falling out of misalignment with their own desired
ought-states (e.g., to not lose an upcoming boxing match by avoiding being the weakest
participant). The previous example highlights that although individual motivations and
methods might vary, identical outcomes can be reached by using either foci (GrantHalvorson & Higgins, 2013; Higgins, 1997). Although all individuals look at goals using
both ideals and oughts, one or the other typically governs an individual’s mindset at any
given point in time (Foo, Uy, & Murnieks, 2015).
Individuals operating primarily within a promotion focus strive for
accomplishment, advancement, and gains (Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997). For high
promotion focused individuals, their own hopes and aspirations tend to be particularly
salient, which leads individuals to target outcomes that allow them to obtain self-ideals
(Haws, Dholakia, & Bearden, 2010). In this way, promotion focus orientates an
individual toward using an eagerness strategy to hit targets when working toward their
goals (Higgins et al., 1997). This eagerness strategy can result in a risky bias whereby
individuals are more likely to take action in order to decrease the likelihood of missing an
opportunity (Friedman & Förster, 2001). Related research from Bryant and Dunford
(2008) showed that promotion focused individuals tend to avoid errors of omission. High
promotion focused individuals are also more likely to express higher levels of creativity
(Brockner et al., 2004; Friedman & Förster, 2001) and possess superior skills in
opportunity recognition tasks (Tumasjan & Braun, 2012).
In contrast, individuals primarily operating within a prevention focus system are
concerned with safety and responsibility and tend to focus on avoiding losses (Higgins,
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1997). Their own duties and obligations are particularly salient, which leads individuals
to target outcomes that allow them to obtain their ought-selves (Haws et al., 2010). In this
way, a high prevention focus orientates individuals toward using a vigilance strategy to
avoid misses when working toward their goals (Higgins et al., 1997). This vigilance
strategy can result in a conservative bias whereby individuals are more likely to avoid
action to decrease the likelihood of making an error (Friedman & Förster, 2001). Related
research shows that prevention focused individuals avoid errors of commission (Bryant &
Dunford, 2008). As well, prevention focused individuals are more likely to experience
emotions such as acquiescence and anxiety (Higgins et al., 1997).

2.3.1.1 The Relationship between Promotion and Prevention Focus
The regulatory focus scholarship has questioned whether or not promotion and
prevention foci should be conceptualized along a continuum, or whether these
orientations are better conceptualized as orthogonal modes. Early theorists in this area
emphasized the orthogonal nature of the promotion and prevention foci (Higgins, 2002).
This was later supported through empirical testing and meta-analysis (Gorman et al.,
2012; Haws et al., 2010; Summerville & Roese, 2008). Such work emphasizes that
promotion and prevention foci should be considered as two distinct orthogonal factors
rather than as opposite ends of a distinct spectrum.
The implication of this for researchers is two-fold. First, the two dimensional
nature of regulatory focus implies that it is not sufficient for researchers to hypothesize
that if a promotion focus has a positive relationship with some outcome variable that a
prevention focus will have the opposite relationship with that same outcome variable
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(Haws et al., 2010). Although some previous research has approached the regulatory
focus construct in this way, a focused attention on the orthogonal relationship between
promotion and prevention focus should be a concern for the theory and measurement of
future regulatory focus research (Haws et al., 2010).
Second, regulatory focus as an individual difference variable could manifest in
various combinations across individuals. For instance, some individuals could be
promotion dominant (high in promotion focus while low in prevention focus), others
could be prevention dominant (high in prevention focus while low in promotion focus).
Other individuals could be some combination of both foci, such as high-high hybrids
(high in promotion focus while high in prevention focus), or low-low hybrids (low in
promotion focus and low in prevention focus).

2.3.1.2 Chronic (Trait-Based) Regulatory Focus
Regulatory focus has been shown in the literature to manifest in individuals as
both a chronic (i.e., trait-based) and momentary (i.e., state-based) characteristic (Higgins,
1997, 1998, 2000a). The chronic form of regulatory focus is a personality variable that is
theorized to derive from an individual’s upbringing or developmental history (Higgins &
Silberman, 1998). Bowlby (1973) points out that the vulnerability of human offspring and
their dependence on others for survival gave rise to these self-regulatory orientations.
Thus, chronic regulatory focus forms and solidifies during childhood (Higgins &
Silberman, 1998). Ongoing subjective historical experiences further strengthen these
chronic dispositions (Higgins et al., 2001), however, chronic regulatory focus
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dispositions tend to remain fairly stable over time (Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2005;
Gamache, Mcnamara, Mannor, & Johnson, 2015; Higgins & Silberman, 1998).
In terms of how regulatory focus dispositions relate to other trait-based
personality differences, Gorman et al.’s (2012) meta-analyses provide evidence that
conscientiousness and extraversion are both positively related to a promotion focus, while
neuroticism and anxiety are negatively related to a promotion focus. Theoretically, both
extraversion and conscientious individuals used an eagerness means (Barrick & Mount,
1991; Costa & McCrae, 1985; Higgins, 1989). In contrast, neurotic or anxious individuals
tend to fixate on negative emotions which are often associated with a concern for failure
(Gorman et al., 2012; Higgins, 1989). Gorman et al. (2012) also demonstrated that a
prevention focus is positively correlated with anxiety and negative affect while
negatively correlated with extraversion and self-esteem. Table 2 presents the results from
Gorman et al.’s (2012) meta-analyses with regard to the personality correlates of
regulatory focus dispositions.
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Table 2: Regulatory Focus Trait Correlates
Trait

Promotion
Focus (r)

Prevention
Focus (r)

Sample Size Across Studies

Extraversion

+.30

-.15

Promotion, n=1054, k=4
Prevention, n=1054, k=4

Self-esteem

+.21

-.21

Promotion, n=773, k=3
Prevention, n=773, k=3

Conscientiousness

+.25

+.17

Promotion, n=684, k=2
Prevention, n=684, k=2

Optimism

+.30

+.02

Promotion, n=263, k=2
Prevention, n=263, k=2

Positive Affect

+.39

+.01

Promotion, n=925, k=6
Prevention, n=884, k=5

Anxiety

-.17

+.27

Promotion, n=500, k=3
Prevention, n=500, k=3

Negative Affect

-.02

+.29

Promotion, n=760, k=4
Prevention, n=801, k=5

Neuroticism

-.18

+.28

Promotion, n=1142, k=5
Prevention, n=1142, k=5

Performance Goal Orientation

-.02

+.22

Promotion, n=542, k=4
Prevention, n=542, k=4

Learning Goal Orientation

+.34

+.05

Promotion, n=542, k=4
Prevention, n=542, k=4

Bright Side Traits:

Dark Side Traits:

Learning Traits:

Note. (r) = sample weighted mean correlation. Adapted from Gorman et al. (2012) metaanalytic results.
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2.3.1.3 Momentary (State-Based) Regulatory Focus
Much like other trait differences, regulatory focus has also been shown to be
contingent upon situational factors (Roney, Higgins, & Shah, 1999). For example, a
chronic prevention focused individual who is mainly vigilant in her approach to goal
attainment might shift her approach if certain external factors make promotion outcomes
(e.g., achievement, eagerness) more salient. Thus, regulatory focus can be situationally
dependent. Although momentary (state-based) and chronic (trait-based) attributes appear
to derive from discrete sources (e.g., environmental factors versus biological paths),
extant individual difference research suggests that they should generally result in parallel
behavioral outcomes (Baron, Tang, & Hmieleski, 2011; Peters, Rice, & Sundararajan,
2004).

2.3.2 Regulatory Fit Theory
Regulatory fit theory is a goal-pursuit theory which proposes that an individual’s
preferred actions are contingent upon that individual’s regulatory focus (Freitas &
Higgins, 2002a; Higgins, 2000b). In other words, regulatory fit theory considers the
amplified motivation or action-based relationships that result when there is a high level of
regulatory fit between the regulatory focus of the actor and the manner in which that
actor pursues the goal.
Promotion focused individuals prefer an eagerness means, while prevention
focused individuals prefer a vigilance means (Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004; Crowe &
Higgins, 1997; Higgins, Chen Idson, Freitas, Spiegel, & Molden, 2003; Idson, Liberman,
& Higgins, 2004). When an individual uses their preferred means (eagerness or vigilance)
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or rewards structures (gains or losses), that individual is said to have experienced
regulatory fit. Individuals who experience regulatory fit have been shown to anticipate
and feel more enjoyment while pursuing goals (Freitas & Higgins, 2002a). This is
referred to as a feeling-right effect, whereby the actor feels right about their strategic
pursuit of goals (Higgins, 2005). This feeling-right effect can enhance engagement in
activities (Cesario et al., 2004; Cesario, Higgins, & Scholer, 2008).
In summary, regulatory fit theory emphasizes the amplified relationships that
result when there is congruence at high levels between the regulatory focus of the actor
and the stimuli presented to the actor, or the manner in which that actor pursues the goal.
It is important to note that regulatory fit theory does not maintain that any amplified
relationships will occur when a fit occurs at low levels of either regulatory foci (GrantHalvorson & Higgins, 2013).

2.3.3 A Note on Alternative Conceptualizations of Fit
Research concerned with the fit between an individual and other environmental
factors has a long history in social sciences and management research. Models in this
area are often referred to as models of person-environment fit (P-E fit). In general P–E fit
refers to the matching of characteristics or factor similarities between individual persons
and the environment (Edwards, 2008; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005).
Work in the P-E fit area originated from “matching model” analysis that assessed
fit between characteristics of individuals and particular vocations (Parsons, 1909). From
there, research on P-E fit has been widespread and varied, including work that
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investigates person-environment fit and its effects on occupational stress (Edwards,
1996), employee satisfaction (Duffy, Autin, & Bott, 2015), persistence (Le, Robbins, &
Westrick, 2014), selection (Morley & Sekiguchi, 2007), and other organizational events
(see Kristof-Brown et al., 2005 for a meta-analysis of 172 papers on person-organization,
person-group, and person-supervisor fit).
Although P-E fit interaction research has been studied in the social sciences
literature for many decades, there remains great disparity in the way that P-E fit is
conceptualized and/or operationalized in the literature (Edwards, 2008). This issue is
often considered a function of the general complexity of the multiple variations of P-E fit
and subsets of fit that theoretically occur within organizations (Edwards, 2008; Kristof,
1996; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005).
On the other hand, regulatory fit theory is analogous, yet conceptually and
operationally distinct from extant models of P-E fit. Whereas, “P-E fit speaks to broader
arrays of individuals’ dispositions (e.g., personality, values, attitudes, skills, interests, or
goals), regulatory fit theory uniquely focuses on the match between individuals’
regulatory goals (which are dispositional or can be situationally primed) and their manner
of goal pursuit (which can also be dispositional, rather than exclusively situational),”
(Pai, Lee, & Jung, 2015: 10).
In addition, it is generally assumed that P-E fit consistently shifts outcomes in a
positive direction (Ostroff & Schulte, 2007; Pai et al., 2015). On the contrary, regulatory
fit theorists note that regulatory fit does not always generate positive effects. Since
regulatory fit has the effect of magnifying an individual’s motivation or strategy of goal
pursuit (Grant-Halvorson & Higgins, 2013), positive behaviors have the potential to be
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enhanced in positive outcomes, such as in the case of increased motivation, while certain
negative actions might become even more negative, such as the potential for decreased
motivation (Cesario et al., 2004; Pai et al., 2015).

2.3.4 Regulatory Focus, Regulatory Fit, & Message Framing
Regulatory fit theory has been used by scholars to investigate the interplay
between an individual’s regulatory focus and the way in which content framing
influences individual behavior. For example, research has suggested that the presence of
certain information will be perceived and acted upon differently by individuals with
differing regulatory foci (Higgins & Spiegel, 2004). The presence of positive information
is more salient to promotion focused individuals (Higgins & Spiegel, 2004). These
promotion focused individuals attempt to ensure hits and minimize errors of omission
(e.g., attempt to minimize missing actual opportunities). This type of error, when an
individual does not detect an opportunity when one exists, is classified as a type two error
(Field, 2009).
On the other hand, the presence or absence of negative information is more salient
to prevention focused individuals (Higgins & Spiegel, 2004). These individuals attempt
to avoid erroneous actions, thereby minimizing errors of commission (e.g., attempt to
minimize taking action based on misperceived opportunities). This type of error, when an
individual does not recognize or act upon a valid opportunity when one exists, is
classified as a type one error (Field, 2009).
In terms of empirical findings, Appelt and Higgins (2010) investigated regulatory
fit in relation to price negotiations. These authors found promotion focused agents were
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more demanding under an eager condition (i.e., a condition that highlighted the
importance of maximizing gains and achieving price maximization). In this condition,
agents experienced a regulatory fit. On the other hand, when promotion focused agents
were manipulated into a vigilant strategy (i.e., one that emphasized loss minimization and
adherence to a minimum price), they were less demanding. This condition is known as a
regulatory nonfit condition.

2.3.5 Regulatory Focus, Regulatory Fit, & Entrepreneurship
Over the last decade, entrepreneurship scholars have gradually augmented their
traditional focus from macro-processes toward micro-processes that take place during
new venture launches (Fatma, Mohamed, & Boudabouss, 2013). This progression toward
an analysis of the behavioral foundations of entrepreneurship has resulted in a resurgence
in attention toward many of the core ideas and theories from fields such as behavioral
economics and social psychology (Åstebro, Herz, Nanda, & Weber, 2014; Fatma et al.,
2013).
One of the first articles to link regulatory focus to entrepreneurship was Brockner
et al.’s (2004) theoretical analysis. Brockner et al. (2004) argue that promotion focused
entrepreneurs are superior in developing entrepreneurial ideas, but are more likely to
pivot from these ideas by switching to alternative activities. With regard to resource
acquisition and pitching, Brockner et al. (2004) argue that promotion and prevention
focus are both critical for persuading external parties to support their ventures. Likewise,
they argue that proving out the business model requires a combination of promotion and
prevention modes. However, this work did not empirically test these propositions.
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In terms of empirical work, McMullen & Shepherd (McMullen & Shepherd,
2002) examined differences between nascent entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs and
found that the chronic promotion focus of nascent entrepreneurs was significantly higher
than that of non-entrepreneurs. With regard to entrepreneurial processes, scholarship has
demonstrated a link between regulatory focus and creativity (Friedman & Förster, 2001),
intent to start a new venture (McMullen & Shepherd, 2002), entrepreneurial strategies
(McMullen & Zahra, 2006), creative perseverance (Lam & Chiu, 2002), idea generation
(Crowe & Higgins, 1997), and focus (Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999).
Entrepreneur-level and firm-level outcomes are also of critical importance to
entrepreneurship and strategy scholars. To this end, empirical findings have demonstrated
the link between regulatory focus and revenue generated from frequent networking
(Pollack, Forster, Johnson, Coy, & Molden, 2015), opportunity recognition (Tumasjan &
Braun, 2012), and indirect effects on growth, and performance in dynamic environments
(Hmieleski & Baron, 2008; Wallace, Little, Hill, & Ridge, 2010). Empirical and
theoretical findings at the intersection of entrepreneurship and regulatory focus are
displayed in Table 3 and Table 4.
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Table 3: Entrepreneurship Relevant Promotion Focus Correlates
Entrepreneurial Trait / Behavior
Confidence of growth expectations
Creativity
Creativity by employees
Dedication to venture in risky environment
Deviation from original business opportunity
Entrepreneurial experience
Entrepreneurial intent
Entrepreneurial optimism
Growth in dynamic environments (indirect)
Idea generation
Innovativeness of opportunities recognized
Intent to start an independent new venture
Number of opportunities recognized
Openness to change
Procuring resources
Proving the business model
Revenue generated from networking
Riskier investment by groups
Utilizing visionary skills
Weekly contact with business network

Study Method
Theoretical
Theoretical
Survey
Experimental
Archival & survey data
Theoretical
Survey with entrepreneurs
Survey with entrepreneurs
Archival & survey data
Theoretical
Experimental
Quasi-experimental
Survey with entrepreneurs
Quasi-experimental
5 studies
Theoretical
Theoretical
Survey with entrepreneurs
Experiment with groups
Theoretical
Survey with entrepreneurs
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Table 4: Entrepreneurship Relevant Prevention Focus Correlates
Entrepreneurial Trait / Behavior
Avoiding the sunk cost error
Dedication to venture in low risk environment
Entrepreneurial intent
Focus on and resuming an interrupted task
Idea screening
Implementing company vision
Intention to act entrepreneurially
Perseverance through creative obstacles
Procuring resources
Proving the business model
Risk aversion in group investments (no time
pressure)

Study Method
2 studies
Experimental
Survey with entrepreneurs
2 studies
Theoretical
Theoretical
Theoretical
2 studies
Theoretical
Theoretical
Experiment with groups
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CHAPTER THREE: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
In this dissertation, I investigate how displays of regulatory focus by
entrepreneurs can be an important indicator for external resource providers (e.g.,
investors, bankers, suppliers, providers of labor). Specifically, I argue that displays or
signals of regulatory focus serve as an indicator of the way in which the entrepreneur
intends to manage his or her firm in the future, ultimately impacting the entrepreneur’s
likelihood of successfully acquiring resources.

3.1 Promotion Focus & Resource Acquisition

Despite the growing importance of regulatory focus as an indicator of strategic
behaviors in individuals, there has been little consideration given to the role of regulatory
focus at the firm or strategic levels. Moreover, there has been little attention paid to how
CEO or entrepreneur displays of regulatory focus impact the subsequent actions of
outside stakeholders. However, this area is a viable and important area of study
(Gamache et al., 2015).
Since regulatory focus is a motivation-based characteristic that reflects
preferences for strategic action as well as goal-striving (Gamache et al., 2015), I argue
that regulatory focus is a particularly important signal that outsiders seek out and evaluate
when making assessments about new venture intentions and probabilities of success.
Although there has been very little work done at the firm level with regard to the
influence of regulatory focus, there is a considerable body of work to draw on in order to
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develop expedient hypotheses from the study of individuals in organizations, as detailed
below.
In terms of how promotion focus might be an influential characteristic in
entrepreneurship at the individual entrepreneur level, Gorman et al. (2012) in their metaanalyses demonstrated that promotion focus was positively associated with
conscientiousness, self-esteem, and learning goal orientation. All of these characteristics
have been linked to success in entrepreneurship (Ciuchta, Letwin, Stevenson, &
McMahon, 2014; Wang, 2008; Zhao, Seibert, & Hills, 2005). Moreover, promotion
focused individuals are less likely to experience emotions such as anxiety and
acquiescence (Higgins et al., 1997), which could hinder entrepreneurial resilience in the
early stages of launch.
Displays of promotion focus by entrepreneurs can be important indicators for
external resource providers, because these displays of promotion focus are an indicator of
the way in which the entrepreneur intends to manage and direct his or her firm in the
future. In this way, the external resource provider may develop assumptions about the
characteristics of the entrepreneur. For instance, the external resource provider may
consider the entrepreneur as highly capable of providing superior investment returns
because they believe that promotion displays indicate high potential for entrepreneurial
success due to the personality link to conscientiousness, self-esteem, or learning goal
orientation (Gorman et al., 2012). Moreover, promotion displays may highlight to the
external resource provider that an entrepreneur is likely to take an eager approach to
venture growth, thus potentially allowing for above average returns, a common
prerequisite of many early stage deals (Dimov & Shepherd, 2005).
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Early stage firms tend to lack valuable strategic resources (Zott & Huy, 2007).
Thus, in the absence of these resources, nascent entrepreneurs may signal other details
about their strategic plans such as their eagerness for growth or their attention toward
achievement via promotion signals. Such promotion signals may allow resource
providers to differentiate between entrepreneurs who are likely able or unable to
overcome the many liabilities of newness associated with the early stages of
entrepreneurship (Stinchcombe, 1965). These promotion focused signals have the
potential to alter investment behaviors as these signals convey important details about the
strategic intentions of these nascent firms.
In summary, new venture opportunities tend to facilitate the possibility of large
potential investment returns that are sought by early stage external resource providers
(Dimov & Shepherd, 2005). Accordingly, I argue that displays which reveal eager
strategic intentions and a focus on achievement have the potential to be particularly
valuable to early stage resource providers. Ultimately, these displays are likely to
increase resource acquisition success for the firm. Formally, I hypothesize:
H1a: There is a positive relationship between displays of promotion focus and
resource acquisition.

3.2 Prevention Focus & Resource Acquisition

Although the two regulatory focus strategies are very different in terms of their
procedures and focus, neither strategy should be considered superior a priori, as their
respective efficiency is contingent on the nature of the task at hand (Grant-Halvorson &
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Higgins, 2013). In the context of new ventures, both a promotion focus and a prevention
focus are necessary for many entrepreneurial processes (Brockner et al., 2004). For
instance, the idea generation and creative processes rely on a promotion focus (Brockner
et al., 2004; Friedman & Förster, 2001), while the completing due diligence, idea
screening, and task focus rely on a prevention focus (Brockner et al., 2004; Liberman et
al., 1999).
I follow extant theoretical research (Brockner et al., 2004) in developing my
hypotheses to suggest that both promotion and prevention orientations are important
predictors of new venture funding performance. A prevention focus could be of particular
relevance to new venture launch and develop stages as prevention focused individuals are
more likely to regain focus in order to complete interrupted tasks (Liberman et al., 1999),
be capable of implementing the vision of the company (Brockner et al., 2004), avoid sunk
cost errors (Higgins et al., 2001), and persevere in the face of creative obstacles (Lam &
Chiu, 2002). Thus, prevention focus has the potential to be an effective regulatory mode
for early stage entrepreneurs. Likewise, then, external resource providers could likely be
interested in seeking out entrepreneurs with prevention focused dispositions as this selfregulation strategy could enhance long-term firm value for these external resource
providers. Thus, I hypothesize:

H1b: There is a positive relationship between displays of prevention focus and
resource acquisition.
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3.3 Regulatory Fit Theory & Resource Acquisition

External resource providers hold implicit and subjectively based mental models
with regard to the factors that impact resource allocation (Chen et al., 2009). These
mental models serve as heuristics that external resource providers use to determine their
own resource allocation behaviors (Grégoire, Barr, & Shepherd, 2010; Shepherd &
Zacharakis, 1999). In new ventures, ambiguity and uncertainty are ubiquitous and claims
made by entrepreneurs cannot always be easily validated (Teece, 1996). Thus, external
resource providers tend to rely on subjective evaluations of entrepreneurs (Baron,
Markman, & Bollinger, 2006). Moreover, resource providers often make resource
allocation decisions with imperfect information based on their “gut feelings” about the
entrepreneur, the management team, and the interpersonal chemistry between the
entrepreneur and the external resource provider.
Prior research suggests that interpersonal chemistry between entrepreneurs and
external resource providers is a crucial factor that facilitates resource allocation (Chen et
al., 2009; Riquelme & Watson, 2002). In this way, external resource providers either
consciously or unconsciously prefer to invest in entrepreneurs when there is a high
congruence between the external resource provider’s own cognitive schemas and the
entrepreneur’s displayed schemas (Franke, Gruber, Harhoff, & Henkel, 2006; Riquelme
& Watson, 2002). Franke et al. (2006) highlight that fit between entrepreneur and
external resource provider perceptions may be a vital yet under-studied factor in new
venture funding success. Specifically, using a conjoint analysis, Franke et al. (2006) find
that early stage external resource providers tend to favor founder teams that are similar to
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themselves. Whether or not this preference is active or rather an implicit bias is yet to be
determined. In either case, recent work from Lungeanu and Zajac (2016) finds firm and
investment performance benefits can result from perceptual matches between firms and
external resource providers in the form of time horizons, venture stage, and industry.
I argue herein, that the theoretical and empirical work noted above with regard to
interpersonal external resource provider cognitions can be advanced by uniting it with a
related and well established stream of work in the self-regulation literature. In the selfregulation literature, the theory of regulatory fit (Higgins, 2000b) explicates the
importance of matching high levels of regulatory focus to goal pursuit behaviors. This
theory is concerned with analyzing the alignment between an individual’s regulatory
orientation (e.g., promotion or prevention focus) and the manner in which that individual
is actively pursuing his or her goals (Cesario et al., 2008). A regulatory fit, “occurs when
individuals pursue a goal in a manner that sustains their current regulatory state” (Idson et
al., 2004: 927). For example, in a new venture context, a task such as idea brainstorming
about the name of a new product line would match a high promotion focus because it
emphasizes strategic eagerness and advancement. However, this brainstorming task
around a new product launch would not be a good match with a high prevention focus as
it is at odds with considerations for strategic vigilance (Brockner et al., 2004; Idson et al.,
2004).
In terms of the displays sent in entrepreneurial pitches, the self-regulation
literature described above is relevant in several respects with regard to display detection
by external evaluators (Baron, 2004). Specifically, scholarship suggests that when
individuals have a dominant promotion focus they are more likely to recognize a
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promotion stimulus when it is present. In contrast, the literature also suggests that when
individuals are guided by a prevention focus, they are more likely to recognize prevention
stimuli (Lee & Aaker, 2004; Yi & Baumgartner, 2009). From a regulatory fit perspective,
the differential recognition of stimuli by external evaluators has several implications for
the behaviors of those evaluators.
Previous work in this area finds that a regulatory fit increases motivational
intensity (Higgins et al., 2003; Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998). Additional research
extending this work demonstrated that, due to its effect on motivational intensity,
regulatory fit makes anticipated positive mental states with regard to potential positive
outcomes even more positive, and anticipated negative mental states with regard to
potential negative outcomes even more negative (Idson et al., 2004). Moreover, real
investment benefits have been demonstrated to arise from firm and private equity investor
alignment across a sample of 1,194 ventures (Lungeanu & Zajac, 2016).
These findings have important implications for related theoretical development of
regulatory fit theory in the resource acquisition context. Specifically, it follows that
entrepreneur signals and external resource provider disposition that have the
characteristics of a high regulatory fit will amplify resource acquisition prospects. This
association is likely to occur whether or not regulatory fit is objective or merely
perceptual in the minds of the external resource provider. This occurs because external
resource providers rely on their perceptions of regulatory fit vis-à-vis their own
regulatory disposition and the entrepreneur’s displays about goals and the strategic means
that the entrepreneur plans to use in managing the firm (Scholer & Higgins, 2008). Thus,
whether or not the entrepreneur’s own regulatory focus disposition is a purely objective
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match with the external resource provider’s disposition is less germane with regard to
actionable investment outcomes. Rather, what I analyze herein is the regulatory fit
between external resource provider’s regulatory focus and the displays of regulatory
focus sent by the entrepreneur in the pitch process. Since regulatory focus influences how
individuals view strategic opportunities (Gamache et al., 2015), regulatory focus theory
provides an effective and specific framework to simultaneously study the interactive role
of resource provider dispositions and entrepreneur displays on resource acquisition.
I propose that regulatory fit will increase the resource provider’s positive
evaluation of investment opportunities, thereby strengthening resource allocation
intentions. Although this contention theoretically extends the arguments of Brockner et
al. (2004), it has not been empirically tested. I expect that high regulatory fit between
displays of regulatory focus sent in a pitch setting and the resource provider’s regulatory
focus will increase resource acquisition. In other words, when an external resource
provider’s own cognitive schema is dominated by a promotion focus and the external
resource provider observes promotion focused displays by an entrepreneur, the external
resource provider is expected to be more willing to provide resources. Formally, I
hypothesize:
H2a: The promotion focus of a potential resource provider will moderate the
relationship between displays of promotion focus and resource acquisition; such
that when the potential resource provider’s promotion focus is high, resource
acquisition will be increasingly positive.
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Likewise, when there is an alignment between the entrepreneur’s displays of
prevention focus and an external resource provider’s prevention focused schema, a high
regulatory match is derived. Thus, such a scenario will yield similar outcomes in terms of
resource allocation intentions. Although on the surface a crowdfunding narrative that is
dominated by displays of prevention focus might seem discretely dissimilar with respect
to its likelihood of attracting funding than one dominated by promotion displays, I argue
that a high match between entrepreneur regulatory focus displays and external resource
provider regulatory focus is the key factor which underlies a willingness to provide
resources.
As noted previously, the signals sent in entrepreneurial pitches are likely received
and recognized idiosyncratically by external evaluators based on several individual
differences including their own dominant self-regulatory modes (Baron, 2004). In terms
of prevention focus, the literature suggests that when individuals are guided by a
prevention focus, they are more likely to recognize prevention stimuli (Yi &
Baumgartner, 2009). Thus, I expect that when the external resource provider’s own
cognitive schema is dominated by a prevention focus, and he or she observes prevention
focused displays displayed by the entrepreneur, the external resource provider will be
more willing to provide resources. Formally, I hypothesize:
H2b: The prevention focus of a potential resource provider will moderate the
relationship between displays of prevention focus and resource acquisition; such
that when the potential resource provider’s prevention focus is high, resource
acquisition will be increasingly positive.
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3.4 Regulatory Misfit & Resource Acquisition
Regulatory fit occurs when an individual’s regulatory focus and the way in which
a message is framed are aligned. When in alignment a regulatory fit ensues. For example,
when a message is framed with high positive information, promotion focused individuals
will experience a regulatory fit, or feel right about this message (Higgins, 2005). When
an actor feels right, they are more likely to undertake the pursuit of their strategic goals
through their preferred regulatory mode.
In contrast, when the strategic nature of the means for attaining a goal is not in
alignment with an individual’s dominant regulatory focus, cognitive performance can be
impaired (Higgins, 1997; Tang, 2009). Moreover, an individual’s regulatory focus
impacts the types of outcomes that are salient to individuals (Brockner et al., 2004). Thus,
individuals are less likely to notice signals that are misaligned with their own regulatory
focus disposition. For example, an individual that is high in promotion focus is less likely
to notice an anti-smoking marketing message about the negative social consequences of
smoking (Zhao & Pechmann, 2007). When combining the impact of saliency (Brockner
et al., 2004) and the feeling right effect (Higgins, 2005) with regard to predictions about
individual behaviors, regulatory fit theory leads scholars to believe that regulatory misfit
will likely weaken resource allocation intentions. Thus, I hypothesize the following:
H3a: The promotion focus of a potential resource provider will moderate the
relationship between displays of prevention focus and resource acquisition; such
that when the potential resource provider’s promotion focus is high, resource
acquisition will be increasingly negative.
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Likewise, regulatory misfit for prevention focused individuals should work in a similar
manner. That is, I expect that when the external resource provider is high in prevention
focus, signals of promotion focus will attenuate the external resource provider’s
willingness to provide resources. Thus, I hypothesize the following:

H3b: The prevention focus of a potential resource provider will moderate the
relationship between displays of promotion focus and resource acquisition; such
that when the potential resource provider’s prevention focus is high, resource
acquisition will be increasingly negative.

The overall conceptual model appears as Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY & RESULTS
4.1 Methodological Overview
In testing my hypotheses, I undertook two empirical studies. For study one, I
conducted a field study using an archival crowdfunding dataset. This dataset consisted of
crowdfunding narratives developed by entrepreneurs. The narratives were publically
posted directly by each entrepreneur to a popular internet crowdfunding platform,
kickstarter.com. In accordance with the explicitly stated terms of the crowdfunding
platform, I can only assume that each entrepreneur posted these narratives in order to
convey information to potential investors in an effort to facilitate the acquisition of
resources for their venture. I describe the details of these narratives in more detail in the
section below. Through the use of such narratives - which vary in their use of promotion
and prevention displays - I was able to test the main effect hypotheses (H1a, H1b). H1a &
H1b make predictions about the directional effects of promotion and prevention displays
on funding performance.
Next, I undertook a second study to address certain limitations of the Study One
archival data set. The archival crowdfunding dataset utilized in Study One has many
advantages, including its ability to deliver externally valid results to the content domain.
However, one challenge with the archival crowdfunding dataset is that it obscures
individual-level resource provider characteristics, thereby eliminating the possibility to
observe the interplay of the external resource provider’s regulatory focus and the
entrepreneur’s displays of regulatory focus (i.e., regulatory fit) and the influence of these
variables on resource acquisition. Thus, in order to go further and assess the hypothesized
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regulatory fit influences, I developed a quasi-experimental between participant design in
Study Two and used an online survey instrument to measure the chronic regulatory focus
of the participants. Using this approach, I tested how regulatory fit (H2a, H2b) and
regulatory misfit (H3a, H3b) between the external resource provider’s regulatory focus
and the regulatory focus displays by entrepreneurs either amplified or attenuated the
regulatory focus signal and resource acquisition relationship.
4.2 Study One
4.2.1 Study One Procedure
For the purposes of examining the role of regulatory focus displays on
crowdfunding performance, I analyzed a random sample of crowdfunding narratives from
the crowdfunding platform, Kickstarter. The Kickstarter platform has become a
significant source of funding for emerging organizations, amassing more than $2.1 billion
from over 25 million investments over 86,407 projects since its inception (Kickstarter,
2015). Each individual campaign is hosted directly on the website and its content is
contained on a single webpage. The webpage typically contains a textual narrative and
video pitch describing the entrepreneurial founders, the scope of the opportunity, the
prospects for the project, and the planned actions of the founders to capitalize on the
opportunity.
To analyze these entrepreneurs’ video and textual narratives, I conducted a
content analysis of the campaign narratives (e.g., Boyd, Gove, & Hitt, 2005; Smith &
Taffler, 2000). More specifically, I used a computer-aided text analysis approach (e.g.,
Boling, Pieper, & Covin, 2015; Brigham, Lumpkin, Payne, & Zachary, 2014; McKenny,
Short, & Payne, 2013). Computer-aided text analysis uses textual narratives to measure
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the frequency of variables based on the presence of words and word families used in the
narratives. I describe this procedure in more detail below with regard to the promotion
and prevention focused words and word families.
Analysis of publicly available content has emerged as a viable and useful
methodological technique for various questions in the management literature (Marcel,
Barr, & Duhaime, 2010; Moss et al., 2015; Rhee & Fiss, 2014). In the strategic
management literature, scholars have used CEO shareholder letters to capture proximal
measures of CEO cognitions, attention, and characteristics (e.g., Kaplan, 2008). In this
study, I leverage this approach for a new form of publicly available content; the
crowdfunding campaign.

4.2.2 Study One Sample
For Study One, I used a sample of 900 crowdfunding campaigns randomly drawn
from a publicly available listing of 45,815 crowdfunding campaigns from the Kickstarter
platform (Mollick, 2014). Using this sample to test my hypotheses was advantageous for
several reasons. First, although the dataset does not contain the entire population of
crowdfunding campaigns, it does contain approximately 91% of the campaigns posted
publicly on Kickstarter over a three year period ending June 2, 2012. Second, the dataset
is comparable to the sampling timeframes of previously conducted crowdfunding studies
(e.g., Mollick, 2014), and thus the dataset will allow me to discuss my results in the
context of the other studies.
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4.2.3 Study One Measures
4.2.3.1 Dependent Variable: Resource Acquisition
On crowdfunding platforms, entrepreneurs set a funding target at the beginning of
the campaign with regard to the targeted financial resources they seek to acquire. Funders
then begin to commit capital to the campaign on a rolling basis. These funds are then held
in trust by the crowdfunding platform until the end of the crowdfunding campaign. If the
funding target is not completely obtained prior to the last day of the predetermined
campaign timeframe, then the funders are refunded their entire investment amount and
the entrepreneur receives no funds. This is known as the all or nothing funding model. In
the all or nothing funding model, resource acquisition is dependent upon fully reaching
one’s crowdfunding target. Meeting this all or nothing funding target is the core and most
salient crowdfunding resource acquisition outcome (Anglin et al., 2015; Mollick, 2014).
Following extant literature (Mollick, 2014), I created a dichotomous resource
acquisition variable based on the success of the campaign with outcome coded as
“1”when the funding target was obtained by the entrepreneur and as “0” when the target
was not obtained. The use of a dichotomous resource acquisition variable is advantageous
as it allows for theoretical comparability with extant new venture finance research in
other contexts that use a similar dichotomous resource acquisition dependent variable
(e.g., Batjargal, 2007).

4.2.3.2 Independent Variables: Promotion and Prevention Focus Displays
Using the Study One dataset, I measured displays of promotion and prevention
focus in both textual and video crowdfunding narratives. Computer-aided textual analysis
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allowed me to measure the presence of promotion and prevention focused words and
word families found in the various text and video pitch narratives.
To measure displays of promotion and prevention focus I developed and utilized
an independently validated CATA measure by following guidelines from Short et
al.(2010) and McKenny et al. (2013). The process included the following general phases:
defining the construct and dimensionality, generating a deductive word list, generating an
inductive word list, refining the initial word list using expert raters, and selecting a
sample from which to assess predictive validity. In the initial deductive word list
generation stage, researchers are advised to develop an exhaustive list of synonyms using
an existing listing of similar words and phrases. This can be achieved by using Rodale’s
(1978) The Synonym Finder, for example (see Short et al., 2010).
When developing word lists, examining existing scales can provide researchers
with an efficient way to identify words and phrases that might be appropriate for
inclusion in the CATA measure (Short et al., 2010). Thus, to supplement the deductive
word list generation approach, I also drew upon recent literature which measured
regulatory focus words in CEO shareholder letters (Gamache et al., 2015). While
examining previous scales provides a suitable starting point, previous scales should not
be relied upon in isolation because such procedures are likely to result in word lists that
are not fully representative of the construct domain (Short et al., 2010). In addition,
recent critics of existing promotion and prevention focus scales (e.g., Summerville &
Roese, 2008) argue that many existing promotion and prevention measures do not
adequately capture the entire domain of the theoretical constructs as theorized by Higgins
(1997). To avoid a similar fate, my CATA dictionary development was designed to be
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more expansive than previous scale development efforts from inception. Specifically, I
wanted to ensure that the entire domain would be included for each construct. To achieve
this, I adopted the broadest possible conceptualization of both the promotion and
prevention domains available in the literature by following prior work from Neubert et al.
(2008). As such, in addition to the deductive and inductive word lists generated using
Neubert et al.’s (2008) expansive conceptualizations of promotion and prevention focus
and CATA best practices (see Short et al., 2010), all the words in the Gamache et al.
(2015) dictionaries were also included in my initial phase one comprehensive word list.
After the initial word list was developed, each word was then assessed and rated
by two external raters to determine if each word fell within the construct domain of
promotion or prevention focus. Expert raters were provided with definitions of promotion
focus and prevention focus derived from existing literature (Higgins, 1998; Higgins et al.,
2001; Neubert, Wu, & Roberts, 2013). Interrater reliability for the promotion word list
was 83.48%, while the interrater reliability for the prevention word list was 87.96%. To
ensure that no theoretically relevant words were missing from the final dictionaries,
additional recommended words and rating discrepancies were considered in a second
round of word ratings by the expert judges. Words were only added at this stage if 100%
agreement was reached between the judges.
This exhaustive procedure revealed numerous additional words and phrases
beyond those found in the Gamache et al. (2015) dictionary that were deemed
theoretically meaningful to the domain of regulatory focus as assessed by expert raters in
the subsequent stages of the CATA measurement development process. As such, the
multi-stage dictionary development process used in this dissertation, following best
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practices from Short et al. (2010) and McKenny et al. (2013), extends previous work by
putting forth a more comprehensive overall CATA measure for both the promotion
domain and the prevention domain.
Examples of words and phrases that were included in the promotion dictionary
include “advancement”, “dream”, “eager”, “ideal”, “game changer”, and “maximum
potential.” Table 13 provides the full dictionary for this CATA measure. Table 15
illustrates the use of language associated with each dictionary in the sample of narratives
used in this study. Examples of words that were included in the prevention dictionary
include “careful”, “conservatively”, “duty”, “obligation”, “prudently”, and “rainy day
fund.” Table 14 provides the full dictionary for this CATA measure. Table 15 illustrates
the use of language associated with each dictionary in the sample of narratives used in
this study.
4.2.3.3 Control Variables:
To account for possible alternative explanations, I included several control
variables in the analysis. Control variables commonly included in crowdfunding research
include campaign duration, funding target, campaign category, and organizational and
project quality measures (Allison et al., 2013; Mollick, 2014).
Campaign duration: On Kickstarter, the platform used in this analysis, campaigns
vary from 1 to 60 days as determined by the entrepreneur. Previous work has suggested
that campaign duration can impact funding outcomes (Mollick, 2014). Thus, I controlled
for campaign duration following Mollick (2014) by calculating the number of days from
the launch of the campaign to the campaign’s funding deadline.
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Funding target: The funding target amount for the campaign is self-selected by
the entrepreneur. There are a variety of factors that might impact the targeted funding
amount that each entrepreneur selects. Overall, however founders have an incentive to set
realistic and attainable campaign goals because their success and failure in the campaign
are ultimately contingent upon reaching the funding target that they had set at the
beginning of the campaign. Recent work has revealed that, ceteris paribus, the higher the
campaign funding target, the less likely it is that the campaign will be funded (Allison et
al., 2013). Thus, I controlled for funding target (logged, in US dollars).
Organizational & project quality. Since I was specifically interested in assessing
the impact of promotion and prevention focused language, the underlying organizational
or project quality are important controls to include in this analysis. To control for these
effects, I created four independent measures of organization and project quality. First, a
platform-specific project quality variable – Org. Quality Control 1: Staff Pick – was
created to identify whether the campaign was vetted and whether it was featured directly
on the platform itself. Kickstarter occasionally features certain campaigns by designating
them as staff picks. Staff picks have a greater likelihood of being displayed on the
platform’s landing page and also feature a staff pick logo. This logo is typically found in
the upper corner of the campaign narrative and clearly identifies the campaign as a staff
pick. A sample of a campaign page that has been designated as a staff pick is displayed as
Figure 4. Being selected as a staff pick is a sign of organizational quality as vetted by the
crowdfunding platform staff directly and thus represents a platform specific
operationalization of organizational quality derived from archival data.
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To ensure that organizational and project quality was sufficiently accounted for, I
included three additional organizational quality controls by using Anglin et al. (2015)
validated three dimensional organizational quality CATA measure. This measure
differentiates and codes each narrative for three related types of organizational quality
(i.e., high-tech organizations, organizations with proprietary products or services, and
organizations that have completed prototype development). These three organizational
quality sub-types are recognized in the literature as key criteria and were originally put
forth by MacMillan, Siegel, and Narasimha (1986) in their classic study in which the
authors identified the key criteria used by investors when assessing new venture
opportunities. Each dimension has its own CATA dictionary and each firm narrative was
analyzed along each dimension with the Cat Scanner software program (McKenny &
Short, 2012).
The high-tech dimension identifies whether or not the organization is classified as
or described as high-tech. The word list includes terms such as “cybernetics”, “hightech”, “nanotechnology”, and “technology.” The original word list was developed by
Anglin et al.(2015) by adapting descriptive words and phrases from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics Level-1 high technology industries list (Heckler, 2005) and by broadly
following Short et al.’s (2010) deductive/inductive process for creating word lists. This
variable appears in my analysis as Org. Quality Control 2: High-tech.
The second dimension, proprietary, identifies whether or not the organization’s
products or services are classified as or described as proprietary and/or whether or not
they are described as otherwise being protected or protectable. This dimension was also
developed by Anglin et al. (2015) by adapting the words and phrases from the Glossary
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of Intellectual Property Terms published by the U.S. Department of State (U.S
Department of State & U.S. Department of State, 2008). The authors broadly followed
Short et al.’s (2010) deductive/inductive process. The final word list includes terms such
as “patent”, “brand”, and “copyright.” This variable appears in my analysis as Org.
Quality Control 4: Prototyped. The final organizational quality dimension, prototyped,
identifies whether or not the organization’s product or service is classified as or described
as being developed to the point of a functioning prototype. This word list was also
developed by Anglin et al.(2015) in accordance with Short et al.’s (2010)
deductive/inductive best practices for CATA word list development. The final word list
includes terms such as “archetype”, “model”, and “prototype.” ” This variable appears in
my analysis as Org. Quality Control 4: Prototyped.
Project category: Project category is analogous to the common industry control in
much strategy research. Industry classification has been demonstrated to have a
significant effect on firm-level outcomes (e.g., McGahan & Porter, 1997). In a similar
vein, project category in crowdfunding has been shown to influence resource acquisition
outcomes for crowdfunding firms (Allison et al., 2015, 2013). I operationalized the
project category variable by following procedures used by Mollick (2014) in which
eleven internal Kickstarter project category were dummy coded; art, design, fashion,
food, games, music, photography, publishing, technology, theater, and video & film.
Table 8 displays each of these categories and their effects on resource acquisition.
Year: The data utilized in this study spans a time period from 2009 to 2012. To
control for the effect of year on the outcome variable of interest, dummy coded control
variables were created and entered into the model. The purpose of these dummy coded
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variables was to account for the effects of general economic trends or stochastic events
that might occur within the time period of the sample. Such a control follows extant work
in strategic management (e.g., Rumelt, 1991; Sharp, Bergh, & Li, 2013) and
entrepreneurship literatures (e.g., Fitza, Matusik, & Mosakowski, 2009; George, 2005).

4.2.4 Study One Results
4.2.4.1 Study One statistical procedures
Study One was conducted to test the direct effect of regulatory focus displays on
resource acquisition. Count variables for promotion focus displays and prevention focus
displays were calculated for both the textual and video narratives for each campaign in
the sample using the CATA software program CAT Scanner (McKenny & Short, 2012).
CAT Scanner is a free dictionary-based CATA tool for Windows-based computers that
allows researchers to quickly produce count variables for their constructs of interest. The
technique has been used in numerous academic literatures to unobtrusively develop count
measures for predefined dictionaries with high reliability (McKenny, 2015). As in
previous work (e.g., Allison et al., 2015, 2013; Mousa, Wales, & Harper, 2015), I used an
absolute count variable rather than a narrative word-length proportional operationalize for
all CATA-based variables. I analyzed the Study One sample narratives using CAT
Scanner software. The resulting output was a data file that had a discrete value assigned
for promotion focus displays and prevention focus displays for each narrative in the
sample.
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4.2.4.2 Study One descriptive statistics
Table 6 and Table 7 display the descriptive statistics, including means and
standard deviations for Study One. In the Study One sample, the mean funding target was
USD $9,556.10 with a mean total funding of USD $4,421.86 obtained at the end of the
average campaign. The mean crowdfunding campaign duration was 39.9 days. In terms
of quality control variables, approximately 12% of the campaigns were featured as staff
picks, 22%, 31%, and 43% of the campaigns were identified through the CATA control
measures as being high-tech, having proprietary intellectual property, or having
developed a prototype in that order. With regard to the use of promotion and prevention
focused language in the crowdfunding pitches, promotion focus displays appear to be
used more often by entrepreneurs. The mean number of promotion focused displays was
4.3, while the mean score of prevention focused displays was 2.3.
Fifty-one percent (51%) of campaigns were successful in terms of all or nothing
resource acquisition success. The majority of crowdfunding campaigns that were
successfully funded tended to be funded just slightly beyond the targeted funding levels
that they had set. However, of the firms that successfully exceeded their funding target,
41% exceeded their goal by more than 20% (overall 20.8% of total campaigns in the
sample exceeded their goals by more than 20%). This finding is consistent with the
published statistics from Kickstarter - the crowdfunding platform where the sample
originated. Specifically, in 2015, Kickstarter revealed that approximately 20% of
entrepreneurs that utilize their platform to raise capital exceed their goal by 20%
(Kickstarter, 2015). That is not to say that there were not some cases in the dataset that
were funded well beyond their targeted levels. The most successful campaigns exceeded
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their targeted goals by 77.5 times, 13.12 times, 6.6 times, and 6.4 times respectively.

4.2.4.3 Study One hypothesis tests
To test the direct effect hypotheses (H1a & H1b), I conducted a logistic regression
analysis. Logistic regression was used because resource acquisition success on
Kickstarter has a dichotomous resource acquisition outcome (Mollick, 2014). That is to
say, entrepreneurs only receive funds if the funding target is obtained in its entirety. This
is referred to as the all or nothing funding model. If the funding target is not met prior to
the last day of the campaign timeframe, then the funds received by Kickstarter are
subsequently returned to the funders, and the entrepreneur receives no funds.
Hypothesis 1a proposed that displays of promotion focus by entrepreneurs would
be positively related to resource acquisition. The coefficient was positive and significant
(β = 0.04; p < 0.05) and thus hypothesis 1a was supported. Hypothesis 1b proposed that
displays of prevention focus by entrepreneurs would be positively related to resource
acquisition. The coefficient was positive and significant (β = 0.09; p < 0.01) and thus
hypothesis 1b was supported. Table 8 presents the results of the Study One regression
analysis.

4.2.4.4 Study One robustness tests
To test the robustness of the logistic regression analysis findings, I retested the
hypothesized relationships using a secondary dependent variable and an alternative
statistical analysis. In addition to being operationalized as dichotomous funding success,
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resource acquisition could also be operationalized as total funding raised (Ahlers et al.,
2015). Total funding raised is a continuous variable, and, as such, I used ordinary least
squares regression following Ahlers et al. (2015).
Hypothesis 1a proposed that displays of promotion focus by entrepreneurs would
be positively related to resource acquisition. The coefficient was positive and significant
(β = 0.05; p < 0.01) and thus Hypothesis 1a was supported using this alternative
dependent variable. Hypothesis 1b proposed that displays of prevention focus by
entrepreneurs would be positively related to resource acquisition. The coefficient was
positive and significant (β = 0.10; p < 0.01) and thus hypothesis 1a supported using this
alternative dependent variable. Table 8 presents the results of the analysis.

4.2.4.5 Study One post-hoc analysis
To assess if the mean difference between promotion focused displays and
prevention focused displays was statistically significant I conducted a one-sample t-test
comparing the mean use of promotion focused displays ( x̅ = 4.30, s.d.= 5.28) with the
mean use of prevention focused displays ( x̅ = 2.30, s.d.= 2.90). The test statistic was
significant (t = 11.30; p < 0.01) and the 95% confidence interval excluded zero. Thus, the
post-hoc analysis to determine if promotion focused displays are more likely to be used
by entrepreneurs in a pitch scenario relative to prevention focused displays was
supported.
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4.2.5 Study One Discussion
The primary goal of Study One was to analyze whether or not displays of
promotion focus and prevention focus influence the acquisition of resources in the new
venture pitch process. Since acquiring resources is a paramount goal, and one that is
critical to the existence and long-term viability of new firms (George, 2005), an
understanding of the antecedents of firm resource acquisition has become a major area of
research for entrepreneurship and strategic management scholars (e.g., Maxwell &
Lévesque, 2011; Moss et al., 2015; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002).
Moreover, the new venture launch process is characterized by ambiguity. As a
result the archetype entrepreneur is often described or envisioned as an individual
intently focused on exploiting dynamically shifting environments and producing novel,
innovative, or unusual solutions to problems which are often ill-defined (i.e., embodying
a kind of promotion focused demeanor). Moreover, a promotion focused strategy has
been shown to allow individuals to accomplish a greater quantity of work more quickly
(Wallace & Chen, 2006), and individuals with a promotion focus have been shown to be
more engaged and focused on desirable economic and growth outcomes (Johnson &
Chang, 2008).
Based on such findings, it would be no stretch to expect that displays of
promotion focus are likely to be valued highly by investors and thus to be more likely to
effectively garner early-stage resources. Moreover, one might also expect that, given this
resource acquisition relationship, entrepreneurs would more commonly attempt to display
promotion focused signals relative to prevention focused signals. Indeed, our findings
confirm this. The mean scores in Study One revealed that promotion focus displays were
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more commonly used relative to prevention focus displays by entrepreneurs in the
sample. Given that the vast majority of the entrepreneurship popular press content and
entrepreneurship textbooks tend to celebrate entrepreneurs that embody a promotion
focused “game-changing” type of demeanor this is not surprising. What may be more
surprising from the Study One results, however, is that, although promotion focused
displays were much more commonly used by entrepreneurs, both promotion and
prevention focused displays significantly predicted resource acquisition.
Thus, it appears that both promotion and prevention focused displays can
effectively garner resources. These results, therefore, bring an additional question to the
forefront. Specifically, if both promotion and prevention focus displays effectively result
in enhancing an entrepreneur’s likelihood of garnering resources, under what conditions
might these displays be differentially impactful, and to which resource providers might
these displays matter more? Study Two was designed to attempt to answer precisely these
questions.
4.3 Study Two
Study Two builds upon the findings of Study One and addresses certain
limitations of the Study One dataset. Specifically, Study Two allows for the direct
observation and analysis of regulatory fit between external resource provider regulatory
focus and the entrepreneur’s displays of regulatory focus by using a quasi-experimental
approach and a simulated crowdfunding platform. This study contributes to the literature
by allowing for the reconciliation of the regulatory focus and regulatory fit literature with
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the emerging literature stream that investigates the micro-social foundations of resource
acquisition in the new venture context.

4.3.1 Study Two Procedure
Study Two analyzes funding mechanisms at the external resource provider level.
While Study One was useful for determining direct signaling relationships in the field
using an archival crowdfunding dataset, Study Two goes further and assesses external
resource provider regulatory focus at the micro-level. Thus, Study Two can be used to
investigate the moderating predictions. To do this, I developed a between participants
quasi-experimental design to assess regulatory fit between the regulatory focus displays
embedded in the crowdfunding narratives and the external resource provider’s chronic
regulatory focus. Consistent with prior regulatory fit literature in other domains, when
there was a high regulatory fit I expected resource acquisition likelihood would be
increasingly positive.
In Study Two, participants were directed to an online survey instrument using the
Qualtrics platform. Upon entering the survey, participants were thanked for their
voluntary participation and shown the required IRB explanations of the research. Next,
participants were asked to complete a survey in which the primary purpose was to
measure chronic regulatory focus using validated measures. For each measure, items
were randomized to reduce any potential ordering effects. This process was then followed
by a filler task. The survey instructions then briefly outlined the research setting and
upcoming task. Table 5 displays the survey flow and specific messages that the
participants viewed.
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Next, participants were directed to click a link to open what was described to
them as a beta version of a crowdfunding website. Specifically, participants were directed
to www.crowdfundinvest.biz, a temporary website that was set up by the author of this
dissertation to resemble a crowdfunding website. Once participants arrived at the website
they viewed a short business pitch including a video, textual narrative, and related
information that one might expect to see on a crowdfunding website. A print screen of the
experimental stimuli is presented as Appendix J. To ensure that the participants viewed
the experimental stimuli in full, a JavaScript code was written into the Qualtrics survey
that would not allow the participants to advance to the next stage of the survey until the
external crowdfunding website was visited and the video runtime was elapsed in full.
This procedure eliminated any concern that participants might proceed through the
survey without viewing the experimental stimuli.
The experimental randomized factorial between-participants design involved a
manipulation along the regulatory focus dimension with regard to textual and video
signals conveyed in the pitch. Specifically, participants were randomly assigned to either
a promotion display or a prevention display condition. Participants then viewed and read
two identical business pitches that diverged only along the dimension of promotion or
prevention focused displays provided by the entrepreneur. The general business pitch was
adapted from an actual crowdfunding pitch that had previously been posted on a popular
crowdfunding website. The pitch featured an identical narrative with an identical video
presentation. The only difference between the two conditions was the use of certain
promotion or prevention focused words in the textual displays and in the voice-over of
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the video presentation. The two divergent conditions of the experimental stimuli are
presented in Appendix J.
In both conditions, the recorded video voice-over was pitched by the same
individual: a former entrepreneur with previous business pitching experience. Both
pitches were three minutes and nine seconds long. After participants viewed the video
and the crowdfunding page, they were redirected back to the survey to complete
additional questions regarding outcome variables, controls, and demographics.
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Table 5: Study Two Survey Flow & Survey Instructions
WELCOME
Thank you for participating in this survey
click NEXT to continue

EXPLANATION OF RESEARCH & INFORMED CONSENT:
Dear Participant,
You are being invited to take part in a research study being conducted at the UCF
Department of Management. Participation in this study is voluntary. You must be
20 years of age or older to participate. There are no right or wrong answers; we are
simply interested in your viewpoint. You may choose not to participate.
All of the responses will be held in strict confidence; no one other than the researchers
will see your individual survey. All data for this survey will be collected through a
secured website, and all data will be stored in a password protected computer. The
survey may take up to 20 minutes. If you have any questions at all about the survey or
the study, you may contact us at ###-###-#### or email@blank.edu.ii
What you should know about a research study:
•The instructions of this study will be explained to you on the following page.
•A research study is something you volunteer for.
•Whether or not you take part is up to you.
•You should take part in this study only because you want to.
•You can choose not to take part in the research study.
•You can agree to take part now and later change your mind.
•There are no reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts involved in taking part in this
study.
•Whatever you decide it will not be held against you.
•Feel free to ask all the questions you want before you decide.
Information regarding your rights as a research volunteer may be obtained from:
IRB Coordinator: Institutional Review Board (IRB)
University of Central Florida (UCF)
12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501
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Orlando, Florida 32826-3246
Telephone: ###-###-####

Sincerely,
Regan M. Stevenson
Department of Management
University of Central Florida
Questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions, concerns, or
complaints: Regan Stevenson, Department of Management, College of Business
###-###-#### or email@blank.edu.
Clicking NEXT to continue constitutes your consent to participate in this study

INSTRUCTIONS
Background Information/ Purpose of the study:
When entrepreneurs need money to start a business they often reach out to friends,
family, business associates and other investors and "pitch" those people on the merits
of investing in their businesses. A proposed new regulation will allow new businesses
to seek investment funds directly over the internet, referred to as "crowdfunding". We
would simply like your opinions on a "crowdfunding" investment pitch. There are no
right or wrong answers, we just want your honest opinion.

Your Task:
On the following pages you will view a short "crowdfunding" pitch by an entrepreneur.
After viewing the pitch you will be asked a number of questions about your
perceptions of the pitch and the entrepreneur. Please closely watch the video of the
entrepreneur's pitch. You will not be asked to invest any real money, but you will be
asked to provide your opinions on the entrepreneur's chance of future success and
your potential interest in investing in the business. On the next page, before you
begin the task, you will also be asked some questions about yourself, your preferences,
and your general opinions.
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Select the box below and click the next button when you are ready to continue.

Survey begins (initial questions)

Participants are then directed to a filler task

PARTICIPANTS THAN ARRIVE TO THE STUDY EXPERIMENT PAGE
The following instructions are presented:
IMPORTANT NOTICE: Please follow the link below to the crowdfunding site. When
you arrive on the website, view the website and click PLAY to watch the video. Pay
close attention to all information as you will be asked questions about the website and
video.
When you click on the link below, a new web page will open up in another tab.
However, please do not close this survey as you will need to return to this survey after
you have viewed the website and watched the video.

CLICK HERE TO GO TO THE WEBSITE
Thank you again for your participation.
Please note, you cannot proceed until you have visited the website above and watched
the entire video. Once this is completed the NEXT button will appear below which will
allow you to move forward with the survey.

Participant clicks the link and views the experiment on a separate web page
To ensure that the participant viewed the experimental stimuli in full, a
JavaScript code was written into the Qualtrics survey that would not allow the
participant to advance to the next stage of the survey until the external crowdfunding
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website was visited and the video runtime was elapsed in full. This procedure reduced
concerns that participants might proceed through the survey without viewing the
experimental stimuli.

Participant returns to the survey and finishes remaining questions

Survey ends, participant is thanked.
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4.3.2 Study Two Sample
According to industry statistics, Kickstarter.com has nearly eleven million funders
actively using the platform per month. 53% of these users are between the ages of 18 and
34; further, 54% have completed a 4-year undergraduate degree, and 53% have between
$0 and $50,000 in annual income (Kickstarter, 2015). Moreover, 70% of the resource
providers on Kickstarter are first time crowdfunders. The mean funder investment on the
platform is $76.19 (Kickstarter, 2015).
To obtain a sampling pool representative of the wide-ranging and diverse
demographic makeup of this nascent crowdfunding investors, I used a group of individual
“recruiters” to identify and gain approval from individuals that met the general
demographic characteristics of a nascent crowdfunder and who had at least some basic
financial knowledge and, at minimum, some basic previous experience with any type of
investment vehicle (e.g., mutual funds, stocks, bonds). The recruiters originated from a
large public University in the Southeastern region of the United States. The recruiters
participated in this sample participant recruitment task in exchange for extra course credit
in an entrepreneurship-related course.
In total, 329 recruiters were identified and asked to participate in the recruitment
task. These 329 recruiters identified, obtained approval from, and presented the names
and contact details of 280 qualifying individuals willing to participate as “study
participants.” In addition to having basic financial and non-professional investment
experience, each study participant was required to be a non-student of any college or
university, be currently employed for a minimum of 20 hours per week, and be over the
age of 21. This final study participant pool is also consistent with previous studies which
73

assessed pitch characteristics from non-professional investors (Chen et al., 2009; Letwin,
Ford, & Stevenson, 2015).
Survey participants were then emailed instructions and a link to the online survey.
The participants then engaged in all steps of the survey (see Table 5 for the survey flow).
Each eligible potential survey participant was emailed a link and invited to participate in
the survey. This survey recruitment resulted in 215 completed survey participant
responses that indicated a dominant promotion or prevention focus, and thus were
eligible for inclusion in the experimental analysis. A total of 19 of the individuals that
participated in the screening portion of the survey indicated via psychometric response
that they had neither a dominant promotion nor prevention focus, thus these participants
could not be analyzed in any of the experimental conditions as they could not be included
in analysis of either regulatory fit or nonfit condition.
To detect inattentive participant responses a manipulation check question (see
Festinger, 1953; Highhouse, 2009), and a content check question (whereby participants
answer questions about the content they viewed) were presented to participants. In total,
eighty nine participants did not provide a manipulation check response consistent with
the manipulation, while six participants failed to correctly answer the content check
question. These cases were subsequently removed from the sample, leaving a final usable
sample of 120 cases. The mean age of the final sample was 41.36 years of age with a
standard deviation of 14.37. In terms of non-professional investment experience,
participants had a mean of 10.48 years of experience, with a standard deviation of 10.08
years. Fifty percent of the sample was male and fifty percent of the sample was female.
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4.3.3 Study Two Measures
4.3.3.1 Dependent Variable: Resource Acquisition
I employed the willingness to invest scale, adapted from Baron et al. (2006) to
measure resource acquisition likelihood. All items were rated along a 7-point Likert-type
scale from definitely not to definitely. Items included, “How likely would you be to make
an equity investment in this opportunity?” The reliability for this scale was .92.

4.3.3.2 Manipulated Variable: Displays of Regulatory Focus
I manipulated promotion displays and prevention displays by randomly altering
the crowdfunding narratives and business videos that participants viewed. The business
pitch was adapted from an actual crowdfunding pitch that had previously been posted on
a popular crowdfunding website. Two versions of the pitch were developed. These
versions differed by the inclusion of either promotion focused words/phrases or
prevention focused words/phrases. All other aspects of the pitch, website, and campaign
were identical. A detailed description of the manipulations appears as Appendix J.

4.3.3.3 Independent Variable: Potential Resource Provider’s Promotion Focus
I assessed individual participant promotion focus with an adapted version of
Lockwood, Jordan and Kunda’s (2002) General Regulatory Focus Measure (GRFM)
Promotion subscale. The GRFM was originally tailored to undergraduate student survey
participants but has been utilized in a modified form extensively in organizational
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literature as a suitable operationalization of promotion focus. This scale consists of nine
items rated and was rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale with scale end points from
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” A sample promotion item is, “In general, I am
focused on achieving positive outcomes in my life.” Reliability for this scale was .90.

4.3.3.4 Independent Variable: Potential Resource Provider’s Prevention Focus
I assessed individual participant prevention regulatory focus with an adapted
version of Lockwood et al.’s (2002) General Regulatory Focus Measure (GRFM)
Prevention Subscale. This scale consists of nine items rated and was rated on a 7-point
Likert-type scale with scale end points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” A
sample promotion item is, “In general, I am focused on preventing negative events in my
life”. Reliability for this scale was .83.

4.3.3.4 Control Variables
I also captured basic demographics of participants including their age, gender,
educational background, investment experience, and self-rated financial knowledge.

4.3.4 Study Two Results
4.3.4.1 Study Two statistical procedures
Study Two was conducted to test the moderating role of regulatory fit on the
relationship between displays of regulatory focus and resource acquisition in the context
of an entrepreneurial pitch scenario. To test the moderation effect hypotheses, I
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conducted a series of OLS regression analyses to determine the direction of the
hypothesized moderation relationship. Although an alternative test, ANCOVA, could also
be appropriate for between participant experimental data (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014), the
nature of ANCOVA as an omnibus test limits the researcher’s ability to derive results for
the directional differences between groups (Field, 2009). Thus, I utilized the OLS
regression technique to detect the direction of each discrete hypothesized influence (e.g.,
detect the direction of the interaction effect) on resource acquisition, rather than simply
the presence or absence of manipulation-level effects.

4.3.4.2 Study Two descriptive statistics
Table 9 and Table 10 display the descriptive statistics, including means, standard
deviations and correlations for Study Two. Overall, the non-professional investor sample
indicated higher overall promotion focus disposition ( x̅ = 5.61, s.d.= 0.92), in
comparison with a prevention focus disposition ( x̅ = 4.26, s.d.= 1.12). Sample
participants also indicated their education on a continuous scale: “1” less than high
school, “2” high school, “3” some college, “4” 4-year college degree, “5” graduate
degree (e.g., MBA, PhD). The mean of this control variable was 3.78 with a standard
deviation of 0.76. Sample participants also self-assessed their own investment knowledge
by indicating their level of investment knowledge from “1” basic investment knowledge
to “3” advanced investment knowledge. The mean of this control variable was 1.65 with
a standard deviation of 0.65.
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4.3.4.3 Study Two hypothesis tests
Hypothesis 2a proposed that a potential resource provider’s promotion focus
would moderate the relationship between displays of promotion focus and resource
acquisition; such that when the potential resource provider promotion focus is high,
resource acquisition will be increasingly positive. The results of the statistical analysis
are shown in Table 11. Model 1 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to
test this relationship with no controls entered into the model. The analysis of a model
without additional control variables is appropriate under experimental or quasiexperimental conditions (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Indeed, statistical controls
are to be regarded as an option of last resort in such contexts (Shadish et al., 2002). This
approach is also consistent with recommendations from Becker (2005) in which the
results should be reported first without control variables, and subsequently with control
variables. If the results do not differ, then the control model can be ruled out as an
explanatory alternative. Following these recommendations, the potential resource
provider promotion focus variable and the potential resource provider prevention focus
variable were entered into the model exclusively. The potential resource provider
promotion coefficient in model 1 was positive and significant (β = 0.60; p≤0.01) and thus
hypothesis 2a was supported.
To further assess this relationship a second OLS regression analysis was run but
this time the additional demographic controls including age, gender, educational
experience, investment experience, and investment knowledge were included in the
model. The results of the statistical analysis are shown in Table 11. Model 2 shows the
results of the analysis with control variables only, and model 3 shows the results of the
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full analysis with predictor variables and controls. The results of this analysis
demonstrate that the coefficient for potential resource provider promotion focus remained
positive and significant (β = 0.38; p ≤0.05) and thus provided additional support for
hypothesis 2a.
Hypothesis 2b proposed that a potential resource provider’s prevention focus
would moderate the relationship between displays of prevention focus and resource
acquisition; such that when the potential resource provider prevention focus is high,
resource acquisition will be increasingly positive. The results of the statistical analysis
are shown in Table 11. Model 4 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to
test this relationship with no controls entered into the model. The use of a model without
additional control variables in a controlled experimental study is consistent with
recommendations from Becker (2005). Thus, the potential resource provider prevention
focus variable and the potential resource provider promotion focus variable were entered
into the model exclusively. The potential resource provider prevention coefficient in
model 4 was positive and significant (β = 0.50; p≤0.05) and thus hypothesis 2b was
supported.
To further assess this relationship, a second OLS regression analysis was run. But
this time the additional demographic controls including age, gender, educational
experience, investment experience, and investment knowledge were included in the
model. The results of the statistical analysis are shown in Table 11. Model 5 shows the
results of the analysis with control variables only, and model 6 shows the results of the
full analysis with predictor variables and controls. The results of this analysis
demonstrate that the coefficient for potential resource provider prevention focus remained
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positive and significant (β = 0.06; p≤0.05) and thus provided additional support for
hypothesis 2b.
Hypothesis 3a proposed that a potential resource provider’s promotion focus
would moderate the relationship between displays of prevention focus and resource
acquisition; such that when the potential resource provider promotion focus is high,
resource acquisition will be increasingly negative. The results of the statistical analysis
are shown in Table 11. Model 4 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to
test this relationship with no controls entered into the model. The potential resource
provider promotion coefficient in model 4 was not significant (β = 0.19; n.s) and thus
hypothesis 3a was not supported.
To further assess this relationship, a second OLS regression analysis was run. But
this time the additional demographic controls, including age, gender, educational
experience, investment experience, and investment knowledge were included in the
model. The results of the statistical analysis are shown in Table 11. Model 5 shows the
results of the analysis with control variables only, and model 6 shows the results of the
full analysis with predictor variables and controls. The results of this analysis also
indicated that the coefficient for potential resource provider promotion focus was not
significant (β = 0.55; n.s), further confirming the lack of support for hypothesis 3a.
Hypothesis 3b proposed that a potential resource provider’s prevention focus
would moderate the relationship between displays of promotion focus and resource
acquisition; such that when the potential resource provider prevention focus is high,
resource acquisition will be increasingly negative. The results of the statistical analysis
are shown in Table 11. Model 1 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to
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test this relationship with no controls entered into the model. The potential resource
provider prevention coefficient in model 1 was not significant (β = 0.17; n.s) and thus
hypothesis 3b was not supported.
To further assess this relationship, a second OLS regression analysis was run. But
this time the additional demographic controls, including age, gender, educational
experience, investment experience, and investment knowledge were included in the
model. The results of the statistical analysis are shown in Table 11. Model 2 shows the
results of the analysis with control variables only, and model 3 shows the results of the
full analysis with predictor variables and controls. The results of this analysis also
indicated that the coefficient for potential resource provider promotion focus was not
significant (β = 0.11; n.s), further confirming the lack of support for hypothesis 3b.

4.3.4.4 Study Two robustness tests
To test the robustness of the logistic regression analysis findings, I retested the
hypothesized relationships that were found to be significant by using additional
dependent variables that were similar on their face and theoretically related to resource
acquisition. Specifically, I retested all hypotheses using four alternative outcome
measures previously used in new venture pitch and investment research. They include
Baron et al.’s (2006) Chance of Venture Success measure, Baron et al.’s (2006) Overall
Idea Quality measure, Baron et al.’s (2006) Entrepreneur Success Qualities measure, and
Zacharakis, McMullen and Shepherd’s (2007) Firm High Growth Potential Assessment
measure.
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Baron et al.’s (2006) Chance of Venture Success measure is a three-item measure
that asks participants to consider both the entrepreneur and the idea in determining their
assessment of the venture’s likelihood of success. This scale was assessed on a 7-point
Likert-type scale with end-points ranging from “Definitely” to “Definitely Not.” I used
this measure as an alternative dependent variable to assess the robustness of the resource
acquisition variable used in the baseline analysis. The results of the statistical analysis are
shown in Table 12. Model 7 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to test
this relationship between a potential resource provider’s regulatory focus and their
assessment of the chance of venture success in the promotion focused pitch condition.
The potential resource provider promotion coefficient in model was positive and
significant (β = 0.58; p≤0.01) thus providing support for the robustness of the
relationship tested in hypothesis 2a.
Model 11 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to test this
relationship between a potential resource provider’s regulatory focus and their assessment
of the chance of venture success in the prevention focused pitch condition. The potential
resource provider prevention coefficient in model was positive and significant (β = 0.40;
p≤0.01) thus providing support for the robustness of the relationship tested in hypothesis
2b.
Baron et al.’s (2006) Overall Idea Quality measure is a one-item measure that
asks participants to consider the practicality of the idea whether or not the idea will likely
result in a profitable new venture. This scale was assessed on a 7-point Likert-type scale
with end-points ranging from “Definitely” to “Definitely Not.” I used this measure as a
second alternative dependent variable to assess the robustness of the resource acquisition
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variable used in the baseline analysis. The results of the statistical analysis are shown in
Table 12. Model 8 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to test this
relationship between a potential resource provider’s regulatory focus and their assessment
of the chance of venture success in the promotion focused pitch condition. The potential
resource provider promotion coefficient in model was positive and significant (β = 0.62;
p≤0.01) thus providing support for the robustness of the relationship tested in hypothesis
2a.
Model 12 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to test this
relationship between a potential resource provider’s regulatory focus and their assessment
of the chance of venture success in the prevention focused pitch condition. The potential
resource provider prevention coefficient in model was positive and significant (β = 0.58;
p≤0.01) thus providing support for the robustness of the relationship tested in hypothesis
2b.
Baron et al.’s (2006) measure of the personal success qualities of the entrepreneur
is a one-item measure that asks participants to consider the practicality of the idea in
order to determine whether the entrepreneur possesses the experience, training, and
expertise necessary to develop this idea into a successful company. This scale was
assessed on a 7-point Likert-type scale with end-points ranging from “Definitely” to
“Definitely Not”. I used this measure as a third alternative dependent variable to assess
the robustness of the resource acquisition variable used in the baseline analysis. The
results of the statistical analysis are shown in Table 12. Model 9 shows the results of the
OLS regression analysis used to test this relationship between a potential resource
provider’s regulatory focus and their assessment of the chance of venture success in the
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promotion focused pitch condition. The potential resource provider promotion coefficient
in model was positive and significant (β = 0.48; p≤0.01) thus providing support for the
robustness of the relationship tested in hypothesis 2a.
Model 13 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to test this
relationship between a potential resource provider’s regulatory focus and their assessment
of the chance of venture success in the prevention focused pitch condition. The potential
resource provider prevention coefficient in model was positive and significant (β = 0.43;
p≤0.01) thus providing support for the robustness of the relationship tested in hypothesis
2b.
Zacharakis et al.’s (2007) Firm High Growth Potential Assessment measure is a
single item measure that asks participants to identify their assessment of the likelihood of
venture growth. This scale was assessed on an 11-point scale with scale anchors of 10x or
more on the investment and a complete loss of investment. I used this measure as a fourth
alternative dependent variable to assess the robustness of the resource acquisition
variable used in the baseline analysis. The results of the statistical analysis are shown in
Table 12. Model 10 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to test this
relationship between a potential resource provider’s regulatory focus and their assessment
of the chance of venture success in the promotion focused pitch condition. The potential
resource provider promotion coefficient in model was positive and significant (β = 0.78;
p≤0.01) thus providing support for the robustness of the relationship tested in hypothesis
2a.
Model 14 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis used to test this
relationship between a potential resource provider’s regulatory focus and their assessment
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of the chance of venture success in the prevention focused pitch condition. The potential
resource provider prevention coefficient in model was not significant, thus this fourth
robustness test did not provide additional support for the robustness of the relationship
tested in hypothesis 2b. One reason for the discrepancy between the relationship amid
prevention-fit and this outcome variable and the other four outcome variables that had a
positive and significant relationship, could be that although a “prevention-fit” facilitates a
positive and favorable moderating relationship with willingness to invest relationship, the
prevention focused nature of these investors may be such that, although they find the
investment attractive enough to invest in, they do not ultimately believe it will obtain an
exponentially “high” growth (e.g., 10x growth).
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CHAPTER FIVE: OVERALL DISCUSSION & IMPLICATIONS
5.1 Overall Discussion
It is well understood that initial resource acquisition is critical for new venture
growth and success (Mollick, 2014; Stinchcombe, 1965). However, the process by which
entrepreneurs successfully acquire resources is less well understood. Indeed, the steps
involved in acquiring resources or raising capital may not be sequential or particularly
well-defined for nascent firms. This lack of clarity, along with the inherent difficulty
associated with resource acquisition, contributes to the high failure rate of firms
(Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Parhankangas & Ehrlich, 2014). Because the nascent stage
of venture development is often opaque and ambiguous, entrepreneurs must send signals
to external resource providers about the quality of their firm as well as their own personal
qualities in an effort to attract these resources.
As a result, a core area of interest for early-stage business advisory groups (e.g.,
incubators, accelerators, educators) focused on advising entrepreneurs on the best
practices of pitching (e.g., how to properly signal to external resource providers). Much
of this early-stage pitching advice tends to focus on sending signals about growth such as
presenting and positioning the venture’s opportunity in the context of billion dollar
industries, describing exponentially growing market segments, highlighting growth
metrics, and revealing the likelihood of high exit valuations (Zwilling, 2015). The
assessment of mean scores in the study did reveal that displays of promotion focus were
much more common in entrepreneurs than were displays of prevention focus. Thus, this
research provides some empirical support that entrepreneurs tend to use a promotion
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focused signaling strategy more commonly as their default regulatory focus strategy. In
addition, this dissertation provides researchers a new tool to assess regulatory focus in
such context – a Computer Aided Textual Analysis (CATA) measure for assessing
regulatory focus in venture pitches.
The findings from Study One also reveal that, although promotion focused
displays are much more common than prevention focus displays, both have a positive
relationship with funding success. So, if both promotion and prevention focus displays
can effectively result in enhancing an entrepreneur’s likelihood of garnering resources,
does this mean that an entrepreneur is equally likely to succeed across a variety of
contexts with either type of dominant regulatory focus display? In other words, under
what conditions might the entrepreneur’s displays of promotion or prevention focus
differentially impact their ability to acquire resources?
To address this secondary research question I drew upon regulatory fit theory and
investigated regulatory focus and fit at the level of the external resource provider.
Regulatory fit theory posits that an individual’s preferred actions are contingent upon that
individual’s regulatory focus (Freitas & Higgins, 2002a; Higgins, 2000b), such that the
individual will experience amplified motivation and action when a high level of regulator
fit between the regulatory focus of the actor and the manner in which that actor pursues
the goal. Coupling regulatory fit theory with prior research that suggests that
interpersonal chemistry between entrepreneurs and external resource providers is a
crucial factor that facilitates resource allocation (Chen et al., 2009; Riquelme & Watson,
2002) allowed me to investigate a moderation model that featured the amplification effect
of regulatory fit in the resource acquisition process. Thus, I investigated the moderating
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role of two types of fit (i.e., promotion-fit, prevention-fit) and two types of misfit (i.e.,
promotion misfit, prevention misfit). Although I found no significant negative effects in
the case of misfit, this research did find support that regulatory fit has a positive
moderating influence on the relationship between regulatory focus displays and resource
acquisition.
Specifically, with regard to the two types of regulatory fit, I first investigated how
an individual’s promotion focus incrementally increased the individual’s intentions to
provide resources when exposed to a promotion focused pitch. Second, I investigated
how an individual’s prevention focus incrementally increased the individual’s intentions
to provide resources when exposed to a prevention focused pitch. In both cases, I found
robust support that an investor’s regulatory fit with pitch framing incrementally
strengthens the investor’s intentions to provide resources to the new venture.
In this way, this work speaks to a wide body of entrepreneurship literature that
seeks to identify the antecedents of resource acquisition (e.g., MacMillan et al., 1986;
Mason & Harrison, 2004; Maxwell et al., 2011; Shepherd, 1999a). Much of this prior
work has utilized cognitive frameworks or explicitly rational models to understand such
relationships. For instance, Maxwell et al. (2011) identified eight key criteria to explain
how investors make decisions on a non-compensatory basis with investment rejection
occurring by way of calculable quantifiable deficiencies. In addition to Maxwell et al.’s
(2011) approach, there are several related scholarly investigations that seek to identify the
key cognitive criteria of various types of resource providers (e.g., Feeney et al., 1999;
MacMillan et al., 1986; Mason & Stark, 2004; Shepherd, Ettenson, & Crouch, 2000;
Sudek, 2006).
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This dissertation supplements the extant rationally-based approaches by moving
toward a model that infuses the role of non-cognitive (or less than fully cognitive)
resource provider factors in the resource acquisition process. The theoretical constructs
investigated herein, regulatory focus and regulatory fit, have recently been discussed in
the organizational literature as non-cognitive psychological constructs (Johnson et al.,
2010). Rather than theorizing that an individual’s self-regulatory motivations are fully
cognitive, Johnson et al. (2010) describe an individual’s promotion or prevention focus as
conative in nature. A conative impulse might be considered purposeful, but not
necessarily completely rational.
Notwithstanding the conative nature of this construct, promotion and prevention
focus are still considered to be highly influential in driving perceptions, intentions and
behaviors in a variety of settings (Ferris et al., 2013; Gorman et al., 2012; Lanaj et al.,
2012). This dissertation finds evidence that regulatory fit, a conative or less than fully
cognitive construct, plays a role in the context of new venture resource acquisition,
thereby contributing to the existing body of literature that focuses on understanding the
key antecedents to new venture resource provider decision making (Feeney et al., 1999;
Korniotis & Kumar, 2011; MacMillan et al., 1986; Mitteness et al., 2010; Shepherd,
1999b). Moreover, this finding specifically seeks to make a contribution to the
burgeoning literature stream that is concerned with investigating the non-cognitive
influences in the context of new venture decision making.
Although, in theory, it is well accepted that non-cognitive factors play a role
(Baron et al., 2006; Grégoire et al., 2015; Mitchell et al., 2007; Shepherd, 1999a), there
has been little empirical work that has investigated and provided evidence with regard to
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how these factors influence potential resource provider decisions. However, research
focused in the area of non-cognitive (i.e., affective and emotional) factors that drive new
venture resource acquisition and entrepreneurship decision-making in general is a
growing and fruitful area (Shepherd et al., 2015). Specifically, this dissertation adds to
this scholarly discussion by highlighting the role of regulatory focus, a well-established
psychological construct that theoretically operates in a conative (i.e., less than fully
cognitive manor) in the new venture resource acquisition process.
Overall, in this dissertation I drew upon a well-established stream of socialpsychology research in order to investigate the role of conative factors in early-stage
investment decision making. In doing this I used a quasi-experimental regulatory focus
approach in to develop a conceptual framework that explains how resource acquisition
for new firms is influenced by factors at multiple levels (i.e. the firm/entrepreneur level
and individual investor level).

5.2 Limitations
This research has several limitations. First, in Study One I used archival
crowdfunding data from a single rewards based platform. The sample was derived from
the population of Kickstarter crowdfunding pitches between 2009 and 2012. One
potential issue with this data is that it was derived during a time period in which
crowdfunding was in its early development. From this data it is not possible to ascertain
the extent to which crowdfunding pitch styles have been modified in more recent years.
Thus, whether or not the results generalize from the time period studied to future time
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periods is not certain. However, using data from four years does offset some of the
generalizability risk. As well, the sample platform and timeframe used in Study One
matches samples used in other published crowdfunding research (e.g., Mollick, 2014),
thereby enhancing comparability to such studies.
Second, using archival data in Study One, I was unable to measure any
individual-level resource provider differences. Thus, the Study One data does not provide
any opportunity to assess regulatory fit hypotheses. To address this concern, I completed
a quasi-experimental study (Study Two).
Study Two also has several limitations. First, the participants in Study Two were
not making actual investments. Rather, the participants were asked to rate their
willingness to invest using an established measure. Although such a measure is common
in organizational research it is not possible to identify the extent to which participant
intentions in this study might differ from actual investment behaviors. However, by
conducting a mixed-methodological design using both archival crowdfunding data (Study
One) and quasi-experimental data (Study Two) I attempted to directly address this
limitation.
A second limitation of Study Two relates to the fixed stimuli presented to
participants. By design all variables other than promotion and prevention displays were
isolated in accordance with experimental manipulation best practices. Thus, I utilized and
manipulated only one pitch representing only one industry. In effect this methodology
controls for industry and limits alternative explanations at the industry-level. However,
this method does not explicitly make it possible to assess how the results obtained in
Study Two might differ under different industry conditions.
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5.3 Future Research & Practical Implications
Given that regulatory focus has a momentary (state-based) component, much
research has been dedicated to uncovering effective priming conditions for the
inducement of momentary promotion or prevention focus in experimental settings
(Freitas & Higgins, 2002b; Higgins et al., 1997; Roney et al., 1999). Studies in the socialpsychology field have shown that priming can occur either through an incidental
manipulation or an integral manipulation.
First, incidental priming is achieved by asking participants to be self-reflective.
For instance, Freitas and Higgins (2002b) asked participants to reflect upon their past and
present ideal or ought goals. Likewise, Higgins et al. (2001) induced promotion and
prevention focus by asking participants to write down a past experience in which they
made progress toward becoming successful in life.
Second, another set of studies has shown that promotion and prevention
inducements can be achieved through an integral manipulation. In such cases researchers
frame or manipulate an initial priming message or the environmental setting in which the
experiment will take place. For instance, Lee and Aaker (2004) induced participants into
a promotion or prevention foci respectively by presenting them with two different
hypothetical marketing messages. In Lee and Aaker’s study half of the participants were
induced into a promotion focus when they viewed the following message:
“Preliminary medical research suggests that drinking purple grape juice may
contribute to the creation of greater energy! Growing evidence suggests that diets
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rich in Vitamin C and iron lead to higher energy levels. According to research by the
United States Department of Agriculture, Welch’s Purple 100% Grape Juice has
more than three times the naturally-occurring Vitamin C and iron than other juices.
Our Concord grapes and Niagara grapes are harvested only at the peak of flavor so
that Welch’s Grape Juice is great tasting as well as energizing. Plus, it is simply fun
to drink!”
On the other hand, the other half of the participants were induced into a prevention focus
when they viewed the following message:
“Further, preliminary medical research suggests that drinking purple grape juice
may contribute to healthy cardiovascular function. Growing evidence suggests that
diets rich in antioxidants may reduce the risk of some cancers and heart disease.
According to research by the United States Department of Agriculture, Welch’s
Purple 100% Grape Juice has more than three times the naturally-occurring
antioxidant capacity of other juices. Purple grape juice’s antioxidants are commonly
attributed to the flavonoids contained in the juice that help keep arteries clear so that
blood can flow freely. Therefore, it is healthy to drink!”
Understanding that promotion and prevention focus can be primed opens up the
possibility that organizational actors might be able to derive strategies to induce a
promotion and prevention focus in external resource providers. Thus, future research that
investigates how promotion or prevention focus priming can influence the regulatory
focus of investors could provide additional insight. Specifically, one could envision
experimental work where investors are primed incidentally through self-reflective
questions, or integrally through the manipulation of experimental environments.
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If such priming techniques are shown to be effective in the lab, it is not a stretch
to envision how such techniques could be used in practice. For instance, an entrepreneur
hoping to prime promotion focus in his audience using an incidental technique might
open his pitch by asking the investors in the room to think back to their first monumental
achievement in their business lives. Likewise, to prime promotion focus integrally, an
entrepreneur could allow a PowerPoint title slide with the company name and a picture of
a rocket blasting off to linger on the screen for several minutes before the beginning of
the pitch.
5.4 Conclusion
In this disseration, I investigated the role of regulatory focus in the new venture
resource acquisition process across two studies. In the first study, I sought to understand
the relationship between entrepreneur displays of promotion and prevention focus and the
entrepreneur’s objective ability to aquire resources. To achieve this I conducted a field
study by selecting a random sample of 900 crowdfunding campaigns from a set of over
45,815 crowdfunding campaigns that occurred between 2009 and 2012. The textual and
video narratives from these campaigns were captured from the public domain and
subsequently analysed using CAT Scanner software, a windows-based CATA tool that
allows researchers to compute count variables for their constructs of interest (McKenny
& Short, 2012). In addition, I developed a novel measure of promotion and prevention
focus for CATA by following the best practices of CATA dictionary development
(McKenny et al., 2013; Short et al., 2010). Next, using this measure and the CAT
Scanner tool, I computed count variables for the displays of promotion for each of the
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campaigns in the sample. The results of a statistical analysis robustly showed that both
promotion and prevention focus had positive and significant relationships with resource
acquisition.
In Study Two, I extended these findings and considered the interaction effect of
regulatory fit in the resource acquisition process. Specifically, I conducted a quasiexperiemental study in which non-professional investors were randomly assigned to
either a promotion focused new venture pitch condition or a prevention focused new
venture pitch condition. The results of this study provided support that both promotion-fit
and prevention-fit had an incremental effect on the relationship between promotion
focused displays and resource acquisition and prevention focused displays and resource
acquisition respectively.
Taken together, the findings from this dissertation speak directly to two
burgeoning literature streams. First, this work provides evidence that non-cognitive
resource provider factors can play an influential role in new venture resource acquisition.
Second, the findings from this dissertation provide evidence that regulatory fit between
entrepreneur displays and resource provider’s self-regulatory disposition is predictive of
increased investment intentions.
From a practical perspective, this dissertation draws attention to the role of
prevention focused displays in the pitch process. Although the vast majority of the
entrepreneurship press tends to celebrate “game changing” entrepreneurs with promotion
focused risk-seeking characteristics, this work shows that when entrepreneurs display that
they are cautious, well-ordered, and loss-minimizing prevention focused, they are just as
likely to be successful at acquiring resources. Moreover, given the right set of prevention
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focused investors, these entrepreneurs may be incrementally more likely to succeed in
their resource acquisition endeavors.
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APPENDIX A:
STUDY ONE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS
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Table 6: Study One Means and Standard Deviations

Variable
1. Resource Acquisition - Success
2. Resource Acquisition - Total Funding
3. Campaign Duration
4. Funding Target
5. Org. Quality Control 1: Staff Pick
6. Org. Quality Control 2: High-tech
7. Org. Quality Control 3: Proprietary
8. Org. Quality Control 4: Prototyped
9. Promotion Focus Signals
10. Prevention Focus Signals
Note: n = 895
** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05
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Mean
S.D
0.51
0.50
4421.86 12277.90
39.90
17.67
9556.10 23623.21
0.12
0.33
0.22
0.42
0.10
0.31
0.24
0.43
4.30
5.28
2.30
2.90

Table 7: Study One Correlation Table
Variable
1. Resource Acquisition - Success
2. Resource Acquisition - Total Funding
3. Campaign Duration
4. Funding Target
5. Org. Quality Control 1: Staff Pick
6. Org. Quality Control 2: High-tech
7. Org. Quality Control 3: Proprietary
8. Org. Quality Control 4: Prototyped
9. Promotion Focus Signals
10. Prevention Focus Signals
Note: n = 895
** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05

1
0.27 **
-0.09 **
-0.19 **
0.24 **
0.05
-0.03
-0.03
0.08 *
0.06

2

3

0.02
0.23 ** 0.00
0.24 ** 0.03
0.17 ** 0.01
0.10 ** -0.04
0.19 ** -0.01
0.35 ** 0.00
0.26 ** 0.01
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4

0.06
0.13
0.08
0.15
0.18
0.24

5

**
**
**
**
**

6

7

8

9

0.06
0.01
0.11 **
0.11 ** 0.20 ** 0.12 **
0.12 ** 0.21 ** 0.10 ** 0.21 **
0.14 ** 0.22 ** 0.11 ** 0.27 ** 0.47 **

APPENDIX B:
STUDY ONE REGRESSION RESULTS
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Table 8: Study One Regression Results
DV= Resource
Acquisition Success
(1=Yes, 0=No)

Variables
Controls
Campaign Duration
Funding Target Logged
Org. Quality Control 1: Staff Pick
Org. Quality Control 2: High-tech
Org. Quality Control 3: Proprietary
Org. Quality Control 4: Prototyped
Year Control: 2010
Year Control: 2011
Year Control: 2012
Category Control: Art
Category Control: Design
Category Control: Fashion
Category Control: Food
Category Control: Games
Category Control: Music
Category Control: Photography
Category Control: Publishing
Category Control: Technology
Category Control: Theater
Category Control: Video & Film

Logistic Regression
Control
Main Effects
Model
Model

OLS Regression
Control
Main Effects
Model
Model

-0.01
-0.63 **
2.23 **
0.54 **
0.06
0.06
1.02
1.14
1.13
-0.37
-0.72
-1.59 **
-0.23
-0.48
0.31
-0.69
-1.29 **
-1.65 *
0.22
0.12

-0.01
-0.71 **
2.12 **
0.43 *
-0.04
-0.09
0.98
1.02
0.99
-0.20
-0.63
-1.51 *
-0.19
-0.77
0.47
-0.62
-1.26 *
-1.42
0.33
0.21

0.00
0.18 **
2.23 **
0.18 **
-0.05
0.31 **
0.78
0.83
0.68
-0.09
-1.03
-1.92 **
0.00
-0.43
0.34
-0.29
-1.17 **
-1.29
0.37
0.03

0.22
221.80

0.04 *
0.09 **
0.24
241.27
19.47 **
22

Direct Effects
Promotion Focus Signals
Prevention Focus Signals
Psuedo R 2
χ2
Change in χ2
df
R

DV= Resource Acquisition
Total Funding (Logged)

20

2

0.05 **
0.10 **

0.178
2

0.00
0.12
2.08 **
0.12 *
-0.08
0.23 **
0.77
0.72
0.57
0.10
-0.75
-1.84 **
0.00
-0.75
0.51
-0.15
-1.09 **
-0.97
0.47
0.12

0.203

0.025
Change in R
9.43(20,874) 10.08(22,872)
F(df)
Note. n=895, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05, unstandardized regression coefficients are shown.
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APPENDIX C:
STUDY TWO DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS
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Table 9: Study Two Descriptive Statistics
Variable
1. Resource Acquisition - Willingness to Invest
2. Potential Resource Provider Promotion Focus
3. Potential Resource Provider Prevention Focus
4. Age
5. Gender
6. Education
7. Investment Experience
8. Investment Knowledge
Note: n = 120.
Gender, 1=male, 0=female.
** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05
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Mean
4.00
5.61
4.26
41.36
0.50
3.78
10.48
1.65

S.D
1.47
0.92
1.12
14.37
0.50
0.76
10.08
0.63

Table 10: Study Two Correlation Table
Variable
1. Resource Acquisition - Willingness to Invest
2. Potential Resource Provider Promotion Focus
3. Potential Resource Provider Prevention Focus
4. Age
5. Gender
6. Education
7. Investment Experience
8. Investment Knowledge

Mean
4.00
5.61
4.26
41.36
0.50
3.78
10.48
1.65

S.D
1.47
0.92
1.12
14.37
0.50
0.76
10.08
0.63

Note: n = 120.
Gender, 1=male, 0=female.
** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05

104

1
0.31
0.24
-0.28
-0.19
-0.06
-0.16
-0.13

2

3

4

5

6

7

**

0.13
** -0.31 ** -0.26 **
* -0.04
-0.12
-0.06
0.00
-0.31 ** 0.08
-0.24 ** -0.29 ** 0.79 **
-0.06
-0.07
0.17
**

0.06
0.00
0.06
0.24 ** 0.13

0.29 **

APPENDIX D:
STUDY TWO REGRESSION RESULTS
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Table 11: Study Two Regression Results

Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Condition 1:
Promotion Pitch
no controls

Condition 1:
Promotion Pitch
controls only

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Condition 1:
Condition 2:
Condition 2:
Condition 2:
Promotion Pitch Prevention Pitch Prevention Pitch Prevention Pitch
with controls
no controls
controls only
with controls

Potential Resource Provider
Promotion Focus

0.60 **

0.38 *

0.19

0.55

Potential Resource Provider
Prevention Focus

0.17

0.11

0.50 *

0.06 *

Controls
Age
Gender
Education
Investment Experience
Investment Knowledge

2

0.15
4.10 (2, 46)

R
F(df)
Change in R

-0.06 **
-0.85 *
0.12
0.04
-0.25

0.24
4.08 (5, 64)

-0.05 *
-0.68 *
0.15
0.04
-0.24

0.29
3.61 (7, 62)
0.05

2

Note. n=120, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05, unstandardized regression coefficients are shown.
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-0.04
0.02
-0.04
0.05
-0.26

0.16
6.55 (2, 68)

0.07
0.62 (5, 42)

-0.03
0.35
0.11
0.06
-0.47

0.21
1.52 (7, 40)
0.14

Table 12: Study Two Robustness Tests
Model 7
Chance of
Dependent Variable
Venture Success

Variables

Condition 1:
Promotion Pitch

Model 8
Overall Idea
Quality
Condition 1:
Promotion Pitch

Model 9

Model 10

Entrepreneur's
Firm High
Success
Growth Potential
Qualities
Condition 1:
Condition 1:
Promotion Pitch Promotion Pitch

Potential Resource Provider
Promotion Focus

0.58 **

0.62 **

0.48 **

0.78 *

Potential Resource Provider
Prevention Focus

0.03

0.05

0.17

0.13

R2
0.18
0.13
0.12
F(df)
7.19 (2, 70)
5.06 (2, 70)
4.63 (2, 70)
Note. n=120, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05, unstandardized regression coefficients are shown.

107

0.08
3.11 (2, 70)

Study Two Robustness Tests (continued)
Model 11

Model 13

Model 14

Entrepreneur's
Firm High
Success
Growth Potential
Qualities
Condition 2:
Condition 2:
Condition 2:
Condition 2:
Prevention Pitch Prevention Pitch Prevention Pitch Prevention Pitch

Chance of
Dependent Variable
Venture Success

Variables

Model 12
Overall Idea
Quality

Potential Resource Provider
Promotion Focus

0.12

0.01

Potential Resource Provider
Prevention Focus

0.40 **

0.58 **

-0.08

0.43 **

R2
0.17
0.10
0.12
F(df)
4.53 (2, 46)
4.47 (2, 46)
3.03 (2, 46)
Note. n=120, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05, unstandardized regression coefficients are shown.
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0.24

-0.25
0.01
.260 (2, 46)

APPENDIX E:
PROMOTION FOCUS DICTIONARY
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Table 13: Promotion Focus Dictionary

Promotion Dictionary
"accomplish"
"accomplishable"
"accomplished"
"accomplishes"
"accomplishing"
"accomplishment"
"accomplishments"
"achievable"
"achieve"
"achieved"
"achievement"
"achievements"
"achiever"
"achieves"
"achieving"
"advance"
"advanced"
"advancement"
"advancements "
"advances"
"advantage"
"advantages"
"all I can be"
"all we can be"
"ambition"
"ambitions"
"ambitious"
"ambitiously"
"apex"
"aspirant"
"aspirants"
"aspiration"

"capturing"
"dream"
"dreamed"
"dreamer"
"dreaming"
"eager"
"eagerly"
"elevate"
"elevates"
"elevating"
"enhance"
"enhanced"
"enhancement"
"enhancements"
"enhances"
"enhancing"
"excellence "
"exemplar"
"exemplars"
"exemplary"
"expand"
"expanding"
"expansion"
"faultless"
"faultlessly"
"favorable"
"full potential"
"gain momentum"
"gaining"
"game change"
"game changer"
"game changing"

110

"increasing"
"increasingly"
"incredible"
"lofty goal"
"lofty goals"
"make happen"
"make it happen"
"make this happen"
"making good"
"making it happen"
"maximum potential"
"optimal"
"optimally"
"optimum"
"outstanding"
"perfect world"
"pinnacle"
"prevail"
"propel"
"realizable"
"reap"
"reaping"
"reward"
"rewarding"
"rewards"
"scalable"
"stretch goal"
"stretch goals"
"succeed"
"succeeded"
"succeeding"
"success"

Promotion Focus Dictionary (continued)

Promotion Dictionary
"aspirations"
"aspire"
"aspired"
"aspires"
"aspiring"
"attain"
"attained"
"attainment"
"best"
"better"
"big idea"
"big ideas"
"bring about"
"bringing about"
"capture"

"get farther ahead"
"go big"
"go for it"
"great"
"greatest"
"greatness"
"ideal"
"ideally"
"ideals"
"improve"
"improvement"
"improves"
"improving"
"increase"
"increases"
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"successful"
"successfully"
"swing for the fences"
"triumph"
"triumphant"
"triumphantly"
"victorious"
"victoriously"
"victory"
"went for it"
"win"
"winnable"
"winner"
"winning"
"wins"

APPENDIX F:
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Table 14: Prevention Focused Dictionary

Prevention Dictionary
"accountability"
"accountable"
"accuracy"
"accurate"
"accurately"
"afraid"
"anxious"
"anxiously"
"avoid"
"avoidance"
"avoiding"
"be sure"
"calamity"
"calculate"
"calculated"
"calculation"
"calculations"
"careful"
"carefully"
"carefulness"
"caution"
"cautious"
"cautiously"
"close down"
"commit"
"commitment"
"commitments"
"committed"
"conservative"
"conservatively"
"conserve"
"conserves"

"fearful"
"fearing"
"fears"
"forewarn"
"forewarned"
"forewarning"
"forfeit"
"forfeited"
"forfeiture"
"go bankrupt"
"go wrong"
"going wrong"
"hinder"
"indenture"
"indentures"
"lose"
"loser"
"losers"
"loss"
"losses"
"lost"
"maintain"
"maintaining"
"maintains"
"make mistakes"
"mandate"
"mandated "
"mandates"
"mandatory"
"market test"
"market testing"
"minimize waste"
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"protected"
"protection"
"protective"
"protectively"
"protocol"
"protocols"
"prove out"
"proving out"
"prudence"
"prudent"
"prudently"
"rainy day fund"
"refine"
"refining"
"responsibilities"
"responsibility"
"responsible"
"risk"
"risks"
"rule"
"rules"
"safe"
"safeguard"
"safeguarded"
"safeguarding"
"safeguards"
"safely"
"scrupulous"
"scrupulously"
"scrupulousness"
"secure"
"securely"

Prevention Focused Dictionary (Continued)

Prevention Dictionary
"conserving"
"covenant"
"covenants"
"customer feedback"
"danger"
"dangers"
"dedicated"
"defend"
"defending"
"defense"
"defenses"
"defensively"
"derisk"
"deter"
"doctrine"
"doctrines"
"dogma"
"down the drain"
"downside"
"duties"
"dutiful"
"duty"
"fail"
"failed"
"failing"
"failure"
"failures"
"fall short"
"falling short"
"fear"

"minimizing waste"
"must"
"need to"
"needed to"
"negative outcome"
"negative outcomes"
"negatives"
"no choice"
"oath"
"oaths"
"obligable"
"obligate"
"obligated"
"obligates"
"obligation"
"obligations"
"onus"
"operating procedure"
"operating procedures"
"ought"
"oughts"
"preservation"
"preserve"
"preserving"
"prevent"
"preventing"
"prevention"
"preventive"
"preventively"
"protect"
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"self-preservation"
"should"
"statute"
"statutes"
"threat"
"threats"
"thwart"
"thwarting"
"to survive"
"tried and true"
"undesirable"
"undesired"
"unfavorable"
"unfavorably"
"unpleasant"
"validate"
"validating"
"validation"
"vigilance"
"vigilant"
"vigilantly"
"vital"
"vitally"
"warily"
"warning"
"warnings"
"wary"
"watchful"
"watchfully"
"worst case"
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Table 15: Language Indicative of Promotion Focus

Promotion Dictionary
Representative excerpts from crowdfunding narratives
… we truly need all of our fans to assist us in achieving our dream.
… become involved in the marketing of one of the greatest stories ever told.
… we’ve seen some great critical acclaim and we’re gaining traction
… since that 2006 show, the full band formed, and we achieved success beyond my
wildest dreams.
… A famous author once wrote, “Man improves himself as he follows his path.” I
think about that when I look at this image. I think about how important it is as a
filmmaker to be able to see possibilities before they become obvious.
… my non-fiction book “The Cannon King’s Daughter: Banished from a Dynasty, the
True, untold Story of Engelbertha Krupp.” Sure to be a game changer in terms of
German history.
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Table 16: Language Indicative of Prevention Focus

Prevention Dictionary
Representative excerpts from crowdfunding narratives
… and we feel a need to protect, preserve and celebrate this.
… because they have turned me into something I should not be. At that very moment I
realized …
… and yet there have been no solutions to protect them while on your camera....until
now.
… why not truly guard it so you can be sure your lens will work and your investment
will be protected.
… Wilson's findings have been validated by three independent labs, multiple engineers,
and his design has been approved for mass-start races by the US Cycling Federation.
… Many Americans may have noticed in the last century, we have been asked to
sacrifice more and more of our freedoms for the promise of greater security and
greater safety. And while every American wants to feel safe and secure…
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Table 17: Study Two Manipulations
Participant arrives on the landing page, reviews, the details of the crowdfunding campaign (see
Appendix E for a screenshot of the simulated crowdfunding page.

Once the participant arrives on the webpage, the identical video will begin to play
with the following script voiced over in the two conditions identified below

Condition 1: Promotion Focus Displays

Condition 2: Prevention Focus Displays

Hi I’m Chris
and I’m Patrick,
and we’re two brothers from Austin, Texas who
are passionate about hydration.

Hi I’m Chris
and I’m Patrick,
and we’re two brothers from Austin, Texas who are
passionate about hydration.

As athletes we often aspired to track our water
consumption in order to achieve our maximum
potential. After years of competitive sport, we
knew drinking more water could improve our
performance.

As athletes we often needed to track our water
consumption in order to avoid dehydration and
other negative outcomes. After years of
competitive sport, we knew not drinking enough
water could hinder our performance.

We realized that it would be ideal if we could
track and better assess our water consumption in
real time in order to be the best we could be on
the field, court, or track. However, successfully
tracking our consumption was a challenge.

We realized that we needed to track and carefully
assess our water consumption in real time in order
to avoid defeat on the field, court, or track.
However, accurately tracking our consumption was
a challenge.

So we set a stretch goal to solve this problem but
in the process of eagerly making it happen we
uncovered a more important question, “How much
water is optimal? And how is this optimal level
different for different people?”

So we set a scrupulous goal to solve this problem
but in the process of vigilantly and prudently
working through this challenge we uncovered a
more important question, “How much water should
we be drinking? And how is this safe level
different for different people?”

Our ambitious research told us drinking the
right amount of water was beneficial, as ideal
water consumption has been shown to increase
physical gains for professional athletes and
weekend warriors alike.

Our calculated research told us not drinking
enough water was dangerous, as failing to
consume enough water has been shown to
intensify the threat of physical injuries for
professional athletes and weekend warriors alike.
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However the biggest challenge to solving this
problem is that we are all different in terms of our
own optimal water consumption levels. In fact,
many unique factors play a role; workout
schedules, age, gender, location, sweat rate, and
the weather all expand the equation.

However the biggest challenge to solving this
problem is that we are all different in terms of our
own water consumption needs. In fact, many
factors play a role, workout schedules, age, gender,
location, sweat rate, and the weather are vital to the
equation.

In the past, only elite athletes had access to
advanced tools to dial-in on their optimal
hydration levels, allowing them to attain and
accomplish their training goals.

In the past, only elite athletes had access to the tools
needed to dial-in on their safe hydration levels,
allowing them to vigilantly protect against falling
short of their training goals.

But, like them, we also wanted to achieve success,
so we thought ambitiously about how we could
increase gains, obtain better results, and propel
ourselves to victory on the field?

But, like them we also want to be sure to maintain
our training commitments, so we thought
carefully about how we could deter the risk of
under consumption, thereby avoiding forfeiture
and unpleasant losses on the field?

Introducing the “Smart Bottle” – a mobile and
connected smart water bottle.

Introducing the “Smart Bottle” – a mobile and
connected smart water bottle.

The “Smart Bottle” connects to an App on your
smartphone using Bluetooth low energy. It runs on
a commonly found replaceable battery.

The “Smart Bottle” connects to an App on your
smartphone using Bluetooth low energy. It runs on
a commonly found replaceable battery.

The “Smart Bottle” improves the measurement
of daily water consumption in real-time. As well,
the “Smart Bottle App” ideally connects to other
devices allowing the app to build a personal
profile and winning hydration schedule unique to
you and your training aspirations.
The initial design of the “Smart Bottle” is
completed and patent-pending. We are now
eagerly working on improving the App’s
functionality before we release it to the market
next year.
We have identified a few options for distribution
but have yet to attain an agreement with any
distributors or retailers.
However, all of the potential corporate customers
we have talked to appear eager to further
evaluate our product to ensure that it will go big
once they begin to carry it in their stores.
In terms of our lofty goals, we have an exemplary
set of financial projections, centered on our
scalable growth plans. We already have previous

The “Smart Bottle” calculates daily water
consumption in real-time. As well, the “Smart
Bottle App” accurately connects to other devices
allowing the app to build a personal profile and safe
hydration schedule unique to you and your training
commitments.
The initial design of the “Smart Bottle” is
completed and patent-pending. We are now
carefully working on refining the App’s
functionality before we release it to the market next
year.
We have identified a few options for distribution
but have yet to secure an agreement with any
distributors or retailers.
However, all of the potential corporate customers
we have talked to appear committed to market test
our product to ensure nothing will go wrong once
they begin to carry it in their stores.
In terms of our business plan protocols, we have
calculated a set of financial projections, centered
on our worst case scenario analysis. We already
have previous capital in place including a fully
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capital in place including a fully funded “swing
for the fences fund”, which will allow us to
ambitiously roll-out and overcome any growth
challenges we encounter.
Our management team has significant new venture
experience. Specifically, we have a proven track
record of game changing success which has
allowed us to get farther ahead of competitors
and gain momentum during the new venture
growth stage. Our team is now focused on
bringing about change in the industry by
executing on the winning strategy that we have in
place to guide our launch.
We believe the “Smart Bottle” represents an ideal
early-stage investment opportunity for the right
investors. Please join us in our mission to enhance
physical success through optimal hydration.

funded “rainy day fund”, which will allow us to
maintain a steady roll-out plan and overcome any
growth challenges we encounter.
Our management team has significant new venture
experience. Specifically, we have a proven track
record of minimizing waste and conserving
capital in order to validate and derisk during the
new venture growth stage. Our team is now focused
on maintaining competitiveness in the industry by
executing on the operating procedures that we
have in place to guide our launch.

We believe the “Smart Bottle” represents a secure
early-stage investment opportunity for the right
investors. Please join us in our mission to prevent
the physical dangers associated with inadequate
hydration.
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Figure 2: Promotion Focused Crowdfunding Campaign Manipulation (Study Two)
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Figure 3: Prevention Focused Crowdfunding Campaign Manipulation (Study Two)

125
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Figure 4: Sample Staff Pick Campaign
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ENDNOTES
i

A conative impulse might be considered purposeful, but not necessarily completely rational.

Johnson et al. (2010) describe an individual's regulatory focus (promotion or prevention foci) as
conative in nature.
ii

The actual phone number and email address presented in the experiment were removed from

the displayed instructions in this dissertation for privacy purposes.
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